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LEGAL FICTIONS AND THE TAX CODE
JOHN A. MILLER*
I do not intend this book be a tract on behalf of Bokononism.
I should like to offer a Bokononist warning about it, however.
The first sentence in The Books of Bokonon is this:
"All of the true things I am about to tell you are shameless
lies."
My Bokononist warning is this:
Anyone unable to understand how a useful religion can be
founded on lies will not understand this book either.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Tax law is riddled with legal fictions. For example, the law
"attributes" ownership of property to one person when it is ac-
LEGAL FICTIONS
tually owned by another. 2 It "constructs" non-existent transfers
of money between persons.' It "deems" property held for a dif-
ferent period of time from that for which it was actually held.
4
And tax law treats transfers of property "as if" they never oc-
curred.' The list could go on and on. 6
Why does tax law set up rules that contradict the facts? Are
these "fictions" indispensable to tax law or are they merely con-
venient habits lawmakers have fallen into? Are there some criteria
for the appropriate use of legal fictions in the law of taxation?
This article will address these questions along with the more fun-
damental question of how one defines the term "legal fiction."
Though the definition is the focus of Part II of this article, the
question of what constitutes a legal fiction pervades the other parts
of the article as well. Each new discussion of some aspect of the
fiction, such as a consideration of its purpose, or of its proper
application, raises anew the question of what it really is, and
sometimes even, whether it truly exists as a distinct form of rule.
This article adopts a perspective that seeks to render the fiction
an objective and discrete phenomenon of the law.7 In doing so, I
recognize that other approaches are possible and, in some respects,
superior. For example, an affecting recent treatment of the legal
fiction that takes a different approach is Professor Louise Har-
mon's article, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine
of Substituted Judgment.8 In her article, Professor Harmon, by
2. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 267(c),' 318 (1988) (constructive ownership of stock).
3. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7872 (1988) (imputed payments of interest).
4. See I.R.C. § 1223 (1988) (tacking of holding periods).
5. See I.R.C. § 2518 (1988) (disclaimers of gifts and bequests).
6. See infra part IV.
7. This might be described as a "typical male" perspective. See Marjorie E. Korn-
hauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male
Reaction, 86 MIcH. L. REV. 465, 465 n.1 (1987) ('male' in the sense that it is 'scientific,'
'objective,' and 'individualistic"').
8. 100 YALE L.J. 1 (1990). The article offers a fascinating account of the development
of the doctrine of substituted judgment, the judicial doctrine that authorizes a judge to
substitute his judgment for that of an incompetent person on some matter concerning the
property or welfare of that person. In an ironic way, Professor Harmon's conclusions
about the legal fiction coincide with those of Lon Fuller discussed in this article infra part
II.B., though with a more starkly regretful tone. I say ironic because, in the end Professor
Harmon has little to say about the legal fiction as a form and does not offer a clear view
of what she means by the term. Indeed, from her article, it is not clear to me that the
doctrine of substituted judgment is a legal fiction in the same sense as I employ the term
in this article. See infra part II. But this may be my failing rather than hers. In any event,
Professor Harmon's disenchantment with the doctrine of substituted judgment (quite jus-
tified in my inexpert view) leads her to conclude that we must be wary of fictions because
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focusing on a single fiction, brings to life its human consequences
through what might be called "legal storytelling." 9 Her purpose
is not to objectify the fiction but to humanize it, and she succeeds.
The more traditional approach taken here rests on differences in
subject matter and scope. I have chosen the emotionally restrained
tax context in which to consider the fiction, and for the most part
I will be concerned with codified fictions rather than judicial
fictions. Moreover, it is not my purpose to defend or denounce
specific fictions of tax law (though in the course of this article I
may do so). Instead I seek to understand the legal fiction as a
form frequently employed in tax law.
Tax law provides a particularly fertile area for considering
legal fictions. This is because tax law is more formalistic and rule
oriented than other areas of law. As will be discussed, legal fictions
feed off of the inflexibility of other rules. The more rules one has
within a system of rules, and the more rigidly those rules are
interpreted, the more need there is to indulge in fictions to make
the system function fairly.
II. WHAT IS A LEGAL FICTION?
A. In General
The legal fiction has long been an object of inquiry and
debate, 10 and it continues. to draw the attention of scholars."
of their potential for grave harm to real people. In this she joins with Fuller and many
others who have written on the fiction. She also recognized that fictions "may be benign
in one context and dangerous or brutal in another." Harmon, supra at 61. As will be seen,
this emphasis on the role of context in the application of fictions was also part of Fuller's
approach toward fictions. But in the end I found Professor Harmon's article important
not for its abstract discussion of the legal fiction but for what it had to say about courts
who decide to permit the taking of organs from incompetents, "terminating their life
support systems, sterilizing them, and forcing psychotropic medication upon them." Id. at
63. It is on this latter score that her article succeeds most clearly by enlisting the reader's
empathy for the incompetent and the judge alike as ". . . two hapless human beings.
Neither of them chose his part, and but for the grace of God, either of them could be
me." Id. at 71.
9. Legal storytelling approaches the law from the perspective of individual narratives.
From this perspective, each case is viewed as important not for the rule that arises from
it but because some person's life is bound up in that case and its outcome. Legal storytelling
is a form of "rebellion against abstraction." Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling,
and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2099 (1989).
10. See, e.g., 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *43, *152, *268; JEREMY BEN-
THAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 441 (J.H.
Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Univ. of London 1977) (1823); HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT
LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN
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Moreover, as a device of the law its use seems never to have
slackened. But its true nature remains difficult to state with clarity.
The legal fiction is an elusive concept because by design it must
blend into its surroundings; it must adapt to changing circum-
stances. 12 On a philosophical level, the legal fiction is the expression
of a relation. 3 In legal theory it may be described as a metaphor.
On a more pragmatic level, it is a falsehood deemed to be true
for limited purposes. But none of these phrases convey a concrete
image. The legal fiction is a form that draws its substance from
the body of law in which it is employed. Thus, it is only by specific
example that the fiction is brought to life. In the course of this
article, a number of tax fictions will be offered as illustrations of
the various points made.
1. The Fiction as Deriving from an Analogy
The legal fiction is most easily understood as having its roots
in analogy, that is, it results from. a comparison. 14 For example,
IDEAS, ch. II (1861); JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURE ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF
POSITIVE LAW § 877 (1874).
11. See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 8. This article offers a brief historical survey of
the major scholarly literature concerning the legal fiction that is useful. Id. at 2-16. Other
recent works involving the legal fiction: Ibrahim J. Wani, Truth, Strangers and Fiction:
the Illegitimate Use of the Legal Fiction in Immigration Law, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 51
(1989); K. Scott Hamilton, Comment, Prolegomenon to Myth and Fiction in Legal Rea-
soning, Common Law Adjudication and Critical Legal Studies, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1449
(1989); Jean-Louis Bergel, Le role des fictions dans le systeme juridique, 33 McGILL L.J.
357 (1988); Bruce Ziff, The Rule Against Multiple Fictions, 25 ALBERTA L. REV. 160 (1987);
Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REV. 871 (1986); James B. Stoneking,
Note, Penumbras and Privacy: A Study of the Use of Fictions in Constitutional Decision-
Making, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 859 (1985); Kenneth Campbell, Fuller on Legal Fictions, 2
LAW & PHIL. 339 (1983); Walter C. Cliff & Benjamin J. Cohen, Collateral Fictions and
Section 482, 36 TAX LAW. 37 (1982) (a notable tax article involving legal fictions); R.A.
Samek, Fictions and the Law, 31 U. TORONTO L.J. 290 (1981).
12. The meaning of the word fiction is slippery at best.
The word fiction conjures up a fictitious world which is juxtaposed with that of
reality. The former is contrived, invented; the latter is simply there, a fact, an
inescapable truth. Alas, the distinction is not as simple as it appears. On the one
hand, a fiction too has its reality; on the other hand, the notion of true reality
is a fiction. Both "fiction" and "reality" are instrumental concepts. The differ-
ence between them lies in their use, not their ontology.
Samek, supra note 11, at 317.
13. See BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 94-96 (Oxford Univ. Press
1959) ("The relation of resemblance ... must be a true universal."). "The fiction ...
forces upon our attention the relation between theory and fact, between concept and reality,
and reminds us of the complexity of that relation." LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS ix
(Stanford Univ. Press 1967).
14. This view derives from Vaihinger whose work is detailed infra part II.B.1.
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the tax fiction attributing the ownership of corporate stock from
parent to child 5 may be conceived of as being based on the belief
that stock owned by one's parent is more like one's own property
than it is like the property of some unrelated third party; in other
words, the family is viewed as more like a single economic unit
than it is like a group of free-acting individuals. The fiction that
comes out of this analogy is that one is deemed to own one's
parent's stock. Similarly, the doctrine of constructive receipt is
based on the belief that once a taxpayer has an unrestricted right
to a sum of money that has actually been set aside for her, the
situation is more akin to the taxpayer's having possession of the
money than it is to the taxpayer's awaiting payment of the money.' 6
The fiction arises when we conclude, from this comparative judg-
ment, that we will treat sums of money which have only been set
aside as if in fact they have been received.
2. The Fiction as a Falsehood
The common feature of every legal fiction is that it states an
apparent falsehood. However, as Professor Ibrahim Wani has
noted, "[flalsity presumes reality which it distorts, which raises
the question whether there is a reality or truth."' 7 My approach
in this article is to assume, without defending the assumption, that
there is a reality and that there is truth. But I do not assume that
either reality or truth are absolutely known to me. Instead, when
I say that a legal fiction states an apparent falsehood, I mean that
the rule asserts or implies a fact that would be regarded as false
in a non-legal context. 8 This "falsehood" results from the con-
version of an analogy (one's parent's stock is like one's own stock)
into an absolute statement (one's parent's stock is one's own stock).
15. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 267(c), 318 (1988). These provisions do more than just
attribute ownership from parent to child. They also attribute ownership between other
family members and between persons and the entities they control. My example in the text
is narrowly drawn for the sake of simplicity.
16. For a discussion of the doctrine of constructive receipt see WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET
AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 55-56, 357-395 (8th ed. 1990).
17. Wani, supra note II, at 56.
18. Campbell contends that "[any assertion is an assertion of a legal fiction only if
and insofar as it is an assertion of that which the law itself classifies as a question of
fact." Campbell, supra note 11, at 356. The law itself, he argues, determines which questions
are ones of fact and which questions are ones of law. The question of whether a question
is one of fact or of law is a question of law. Id. at 358-59. "The fiction arises from the
content of the rule being false when regarded as a question of fact according to non-legal
classification." Id. at 359.
LEGAL FICTIONS
This conversion of the relative to the absolute may arise from
the need to integrate our analogy into a pre-existing dichotomy in
the law. For instance, tax law divides non-liquidating corporate
distributions to shareholders into two categories: dividends and
redemptions. 19 Generally, the distributee would prefer the finding
of a redemption. 20 The finding of a redemption usually entails a
finding that the shareholder's relative interest in the corporation
has diminished as a result of the corporate distribution. This
diminution of interest occurs because in a redemption the share-
holder surrenders some or all of her stock in the corporation in
exchange for the corporate distribution. In measuring whether the
shareholder's interest in the business has diminished, we are forced
to choose how we will treat the interests of family members of
the shareholder. Has a person's economic interest in a corporation
diminished if her stock is "redeemed" when her family continues
to own the other outstanding stock in the corporation? The answer
we would like to give is "yes and no" because in some respects
her economic interest in the corporation has declined and in some
respects it has not. But the answer we are obliged to give by the
dividend/redemption dichotomy is "yes or no." Our desire for an
all or nothing answer forces us to take our analogy that a parent's
stock is more like the child's stock than it is like the stock of an
unrelated third party and turn it into the fiction that a child owns
her parent's stock.
3. Distinguishing Fictions from Mere Generalities
If a fiction is identified by its falsity, how do we distinguish
the fiction from other rules that may also embody some degree of
falsity but which are not considered legal fictions? For instance,
in tax law we differentiate between capital assets and non-capital
assets and accord them different tax treatment. 2' But any given
asset may partake of the qualities of both a capital asset and a
non-capital asset. In such cases, we decide whether the asset is
19. See I.R.C. §§ 301, 302, 316 (1988).
20. If a redemption is found the taxpayer will be allowed to recover basis and to
treat the gain as capital gain. A dividend is simply ordinary income in the full amount of
the distribution. See BoRIs I. BITTKER & JAMEs S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1 9.02 (5th ed. 1987).
21. The term "capital asset," as defined in I.R.C. § 1221, includes all property except
those types of property that are specifically excepted. This definition contains a number of
ambiguities. See BoRIs I. BITTKER & MARTIN J. MCMAHON, FEDERAL INCoME TAXATION OF
INDIVIDUALS 28.3-28.5 (1988).
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capital or not on the basis of which category it most resembles.
If we decide it most resembles a capital asset, that is what we call
it. When we do so, we treat the asset as though it has none of
the characteristics of a non-capital asset. Thus, we indulge in the
"fiction" that the asset fits neatly into one category and not the
other. But would we call our treatment of the asset or our defi-
nition of a capital asset a legal fiction? Surely not, for if we did
so, most rules would be legal fictions since most rules involve the
need to lump into wholly separate categories things that may only
differ by degrees .2 Under such a broad approach to what consti-
tutes a fiction, the concept of the legal fiction would subsume
most of the law and would be rendered analytically useless. How
then are we to make a distinction between rules such as our
definition of capital asset and rules embodying a legal fiction?
There are two connected answers.
The first answer is to say that the legal fiction involves a
falsehood more striking and pervasive than that implicit in other
rules. The legal fiction involves the implied or express assertion of
a fact that one standing outside the legal system would regard as
clearly false, such as the assertion that a daughter owns her
mother's stock or the claim that a person flying off on vacation
has this week's pay in hand when in fact the paycheck is still lying
on his desk at work. Thus, the fact asserted by the legal fiction
must be one that in a non-legal context would strike the non-
lawyer as false, and false in all cases. Often the fiction sounds
self-contradictory. For example, how can I own my mother's stock
if my mother owns it? How can I have possession of my paycheck
if I am on board an airplane at thirty thousand feet and my
paycheck is at work?
A second way to distinguish legal fictions from other legal
falsehoods is to say we are dealing with a legal fiction only when
we can identify a fact-based analogy underlying the rule that
explains its falsity. Rules that implicitly or explicitly embrace a
falsehood are only legal fictions if we can identify a fact-based
analogy from which the falsehood derives (my mother's stock is
like my stock). Thus, legal fictions are not simply rules that state
a generalization that in some cases may be false. Instead legal
fictions deliberately overstate a comparative statement and are
always false.
22. As Professor Frederick Schauer has written, "[u]nderstanding rules requires grasp-
ing the distinction between the general and the particular." Frederick Schauer, Rules and
the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 645, 647 (1991).
LEGAL FICTIONS
4. The Utility of Finding the Analogy
If a legal fiction is characterized by its analogical roots, finding
the analogy on which a fiction is based is a necessary first step in
establishing the existence of the fiction. Identifying the analogy is
also a beginning point for considering the merits of any particular
legal fiction. When the analogy fails to ring true, we cannot help
but question the propriety of the fiction because a good fiction
should be true at some level. With respect to the constructive stock
ownership rules, for example, does the analogy ring true that stock
owned by a family member is more like one's own stock than it
is like the property of an unrelated third party? I think so, but
just barely. As a general matter, stock owned within a family may
be thought to provide some economic benefit to all the family
members-not just the member in whose name title is held. 23 In
turn, this may justify in most cases treating one family member
as the owner of stock actually owned by another family member.
But in any given case a person may have no connection of any
sort with corporate stock owned by a family member. In such a
case, it seems unfair to attribute ownership from one family mem-
ber to the other if by so attributing ownership a detrimental tax
effect results to the taxpayer.2 The fundamental problem with the
constructive ownership statutes is that they make an absolute rule
out of a comparative statement and thereby give it more weight
than it merits. This is a persistent concern we may have about the
legal fiction, particularly when it has been set out in a statute.
The canonical statement of the fiction in a statute can often seem
too inflexible a method of employing the legal fiction. 25 However,
a judicially created fiction can suffer from the same infirmity
26
since, by its nature, the fiction is an overstatement or exaggeration.
23. In saying this, it is worthy of mention that this generalization may be declining
in validity. In the modern world family cohesiveness seems increasingly rare. There is also
an element of cultural bias inherent in the belief that one family member derives an
economic benefit from property owned by another family member. In some societies or
segments of society only the immediate family (or even some smaller unit such as mother
and child) might be the appropriate measure of that economic unity. In other societies,
perhaps the economic unity would extend to distant relatives. Whether the current statutes
reflect the appropriate measure of family unity in this country is subject to challenge.
24. Very rarely the courts have agreed that attribution of ownership should not be
required where family members are hostile to one another. See, e.g., Robin Haft Trust v.
Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975).
25. This notion is developed more fully infra part V where the principle of dropping
the fiction from the final reckoning is addressed.
26. See Harmon, supra note 8, at 63-71.
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B. A Selected Literature Review
In what follows, I have taken the liberty of selecting only two
of the many significant writings on the fiction for special treatment:
the early twentieth century works of the German philosopher Hans
Vaihinger, whose major work was The Philosophy of 'As If, '27
and the work of American law professor Lon. L Fuller, who in
1930 and 1931 published three articles under the title Legal Fic-
tions.28 My reason for focusing on these two writers is that I
believe that Fuller's work remains the most complete and compre-
hensive discussion of the fiction as a form, and that because of
Vaihinger's influence on Fuller one must know something of Vaih-
inger's work to fully appreciate Fuller. This article does not ignore
the more contemporary works on the fiction, but it is the work
of Professor Fuller that gives this 'article its point of view.
The discussion of The Philosophy of 'As If' which follows
attempts to set out the basic tenets of Vaihinger's philosophy with
minimal editorial comment. Some aspects of Vaihinger's views may
strike the reader as rather mystical or even bizarre. But Fuller was
able to extract from Vaihinger's analysis some key points and use
them for his own purposes without denigrating the rest of Vaih-
inger's philosophy. The extent of Fuller's adoption of Vaihinger's
tenets concerning the fiction is never made clear by Fuller.
1. Vaihinger and The Philosophy of 'As If'
Hans Vaihinger, a follower of Kant,29 sought to connect sci-
entific, philosophical, and everyday ways of thinking into an over-
27. HANS VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF 'As IF': A SYSTEM OF THEORETICAL, PRAC-
TICAL AND RELIGIOUS FICTIONS OF MANKIND, (C.K. Ogden trans., 2d ed. 1949). According
to the translator's opening note, the 1949 translation is based on the definitive 6th edition
of the original, revised for the purpose by the author. An earlier translation also by Ogden
was criticized by Fuller as "quite unsatisfactory." FULLER, supra note 13, at 94 (Fuller was
first writing on this in 1930). However, it appears that Vaihinger himself did not so regard
it because he wrote an "autobiographical" section for the sixth edition. According to the
translator's opening note, the text of this edition is "substantially unaltered."
28. L. L. Fuller, Legal Fictions (pts. 1-3), 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, 513, 877 (1930-31).
In 1967 these three articles were published as a book bearing the same title by Stanford
University Press. See FULLER, supra note 13. It is the book version to which all future
citation will refer. Fuller's effort seems particularly impressive when one considers that he
was only twenty-eight years old when this work was first published. See ROBERT SUMMERS,
LON L. FULLER 4 (1984).
29. Vaihinger uses Kant's works as "confirmations" of his own philosophy. VAIM-
INOER, supra note 27, at 271-318. He also credits many others for influencing his work.
These include David Hume, J.S. Mill (Id. at vii); the poet, Friedrich Schiller (Id. at xxv);
Schopenhauer (Id. at xxviii); and, most importantly after Kant, Lange (Id. at xxxv).
LEGAL FICTIONS
arching conception of human thought. Vaihinger classified his
resulting philosophy as "positivist idealism." 30 In philosophy, "ide-
alism" is often used to describe "the doctrine that Whatever exists,
or at any rate whatever can be known to exist, must be in some
sense mental." 3 Vaihinger believed that an absolute ability to know
reality was impossible.3 2 He believed we could only know the
appearance of reality. But he found nothing sorrowful in this
conclusion because of his conception of the practical utility of
fictions. 33 He called his philosophy "as if" "because it seemed to
me to express more convincingly than any other possible title what
I wanted to say, namely, that "as if," i.e., appearance, the con-
sciously-false, plays an enormous part in science, in world-philos-
ophies and in life."
'3 4
According to Vaihinger, a fiction is a consciously false as-
sumption. It is not a lie because it is not intended to deceive. It
is not an erroneous conclusion or hypothesis because it is under-
stood to be false. It proceeds from pragmatism. 35 A legal fiction,
in particular, is ultimately an analogy. It is the means by which
we reduce the unknown to the known. 36 It is how we are able to
think about reality without fully comprehending it. This requires
some explaining.
Vaihinger believed fictions are different from hypotheses be-
cause hypotheses are probable truths that can later be proved or
disproved. "They are ... verifiable. Fictions are never verifiable,
for they are hypotheses which are known to be false, but which
are employed because of their utility."' 37 Vaihinger supports his
30. Id. at xlvii.
31. RUSSELL, supra note 13, at 37.
32. He distinguished himself from Kant and Spencer in that unlike them, he believed
that the limits of the human mind to "know" would also apply to a higher intelligence.
VAIH-INGER, supra note 27, at xliii. This is because the limits of knowledge flow from the
nature of thought rather than the nature of the mind. Id.
33. In concluding a fifteen point summary of his philosophy, Vaihinger wrote: "It
is senseless to question the meaning of the universe, and this is the idea expressed in
Schiller's words: 'Know this, a mind sublime puts greatness into life, yet seeks it not
therein' (Huldigung der Kunste 1805). This is positivist idealism." Id. at xlvii.
34. Id. at xli.
35. Vaihinger claims that the "world of motion" and the "world of consciousness"
have never been unified by any philosophy. Id. at xliv. But he says these problems fade
away when we are in action. "We do not understand the world when we are pondering
over its problems, but when we are doing the world's work. Here too the practical reigns
supreme." Id. at xlv.
36. "[AIll knowledge is a reduction from the unknown to the known, that is to say
a comparison." Id. at xliii.
37. Id. at xlii.
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analysis primarily with examples drawn from math and science. 8
As Fuller notes, he seems to have been relatively unfamiliar with
legal fictions.3 9 As an example of a juristic fiction, Vaihinger points
to the rule that an adopted child is regarded as if she were a real
child of the adopting parent.40 I will have more to say about this
"fiction" later.
In Vaihinger's view, the processes of thought are like organic
processes of growth, development, adaptation, healing, and so
on.4' "The psyche... is an organic formative force.' ' 42 The quality
of our thought processes is vindicated by "practical corrobora-
tion." ' 43 For the most part, the organic function of thought is
carried on unconsciously. 44 Human errors of thought originate
through taking our thought processes to be copies of reality 45 when,
in fact, the utility of our logical processes arises from the divergent
route they take in order to achieve coincidence with reality in the
end.46
Vaihinger distinguished between "rules of thought" and "ar-
tifices." Rules of thought are the "totality of all those technical
operations in virtue of which an activity is able to attain its object
directly." 47 Thus, rules of thought are like rules of logic that state
a position directly, with the conclusion flowing inevitably from the
stated premises.
4 1
38. Id. at 17-77. Another, more recent, writer says that "[despite the apparent
objectivity of the empirical sciences, the use of knowingly false propositions-that is,
fictions-is surprisingly pervasive." Hamilton, supra note 11, at 1455.
39. FULLER, supra note 13, at 117 n. 48. Vaihinger calls them (in translation) "Juristic
Fictions" and devotes a brief chapter to them. VAIHINGER, supra note 27, at 33-35. He
begins that chapter, however, by acknowledging that "the term fiction has hitherto been
nowhere better known than in jurisprudence where it forms a favourite subject of discus-
sion." Id. at 33.
40. VAIHINGER, supra note 27, at 50. Henry Sumner Maine also considered adoption
as a form of legal fiction. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH
THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 33 (10th ed. 1930).
Fuller, as will be discussed, would dispute this. FULLER, supra note 13, at 39.
41. VAIHINOER, supra note 27, at 1-2.
42. Id. at 2. He credits Steinthal with "this view of the organic function of the
logical movements involved in knowing." Id. According to Steinthal, says Vaihinger,
"Thought . . . must be regarded as a mechanism, as a machine, as an instrument in the
service of life." Id. at 5.
43. Id. at 3.
44. Id. at 7.
45. Id. at 8. Vaihinger credits Kant with this idea. Id. at 8 n.l.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 11.
48. The logical syllogism is an apt illustration of a rule of thought. For example, the
tax law may provide that all income is taxable (major premise). If we then say that one's
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The artifices ... are those operations ... which run counter
to ordinary procedure in a more or less paradoxical way. They
are methods which give one the impression of magic if he be
not himself initiated ... and are able indirectly to overcome
the difficulties which the material in question opposes to the
activity. 49
The fiction is an artifice of thought.50 Such artifices do not mirror
reality but serve as tools for moving within it. "Thought begins
with slight initial deviations from reality (half-fictions), and, be-
coming bolder and bolder, ends by operating with constructs that
are not only opposed to the facts but are self-contradictory."',
This view of fictions as tending toward self-contradiction has
considerable importance for how fictions are used and misused.
Since some fictions ultimately lead to self-contradiction (for ex-
ample, I have my paycheck in hand even though it is at work, or
I own my mother's stock), they are only properly used if their
fictive nature is recognized and accepted .52 Since fictions are by
definition false on some level, failure to recognize fictions as fiction
leads to their misuse.
Vaihinger describes many categories of fictions,53 the most
significant of which, for our purposes, is the "symbolic" or "an-
alogical" fiction. According to Vaihinger, these fictions are related
to poetic similes as well as to myth.54 These fictions rest on a
perceived similarity between one idea or object and another idea
or object,55 and are necessary because we can understand something
new only by reference to what we already know.56 Analogical
salary is income (minor premise), it logically follows that one's salary is taxable (conclusion).
If we wanted to illustrate how a fiction can operate within this framework, we could simply
create a falsehood that would activate this syllogism. For instance, we could establish as a
rule the fiction that a law student's grades represent income to her. When we plug this
fiction into our syllogism, we reach the conclusion that each time a student receives her
grades she has taxable income. This is illustrative of the connection between fictions and
pre-existing law that is addressed in some detail infra part III.A. The usual rule of law,
like Vaihinger's rule of thought, approaches its objective directly by means of stated
premises. The legal fiction, like the artifice of thought, approaches its objective indirectly
by means of falsehoods that activate the rules of law in circumstances where they would
ordinarily not apply.
49. VAMINGER, supra note 27, at 11.
50. Id. at 12. "[Flictions are mental structures." Id.
51. Id. at 15-16.
52. Id. at 18-19; see also id. at 20, 31, 49, 56 for examples.
53. Id. at 17-77.
54. Id. at 27.
55. "All cognition is the apperception of one thing through another." Id. at 29.
56. According to Vaihinger, Kant demonstrated that it is impossible to attain absolute
knowledge of the world "because knowledge is always in the form of categories and these,
in the last analysis, are only analogical apperceptions." Id. at 29-30.
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fictions are symbolic because they rest on perceived similarities
between phenomena, and there is no reason to believe that these
perceptions accurately portray objective reality."
In Vaihinger's view, the legal fiction is in principle a form of
the symbolic or analogical fiction." Commonly, legal fictions cause
us to regard something which has not happened as if it has
happened or vice versa.5 9 Vaihinger offers as an example the rule
in German commercial law that failure to timely reject goods is
treated as if the goods were accepted.6 0 The underlying basis for
such treatment is that while, in fact, the two cases are different,
in principle they are analogous because in both cases the buyer's
conduct. with respect to the goods is similar. In short, by keeping
silent while keeping the goods, the buyer has acted as though he
has accepted the goods.
The most important thing to understand about the fiction,
according to Vaihinger, is that its great utility derives directly from
its "deviation from reality."
6
1
Without such deviations thought cannot attain its purposes, and
this is quite natural, for how otherwise could thought manip-
ulate and elaborate what is given? It is just the deviation that,
in the end, appears to be the natural procedure, and it is
absolutely necessary constantly to stress this fact and draw
attention to it.62
Thus, for instance, the doctrine of constructive receipt is only
useful because it states a falsehood. If we have actual possession
of our paycheck, there is no need for the doctrine. But when we
lack actual possession in circumstances analogous to actual pos-
session, the doctrine serves to treat the analogous circumstance in
a fashion that comports with our view of economic symmetry.
Even though the doctrine does this by asserting that we have
possession at a time when we lack possession, the assertion still
seems perfectly natural in the context in which it is made.
It should be apparent that Vaihinger views all categories of
fictions, including legal fictions, in a positive light. To him they
57. "We can only say that objective phenomena can be regarded as if they behaved
in such and such a way, and there is absolutely no justification for assuming any dogmatic
attitude and changing the 'as if' into a 'that."' Id. at 31. This is a reminder of Vaihinger's
belief in "idealism," i.e., that whatever exists is in some sense mental.
58. Id. at 33.
59, Id. at 34.




are essential tools of human thought. To view fictions as evil
would make no more sense to Vaihinger than to view as evil the
water we drink or the air we breathe. This is not to say that he
saw no risk in their use. As noted previously, he believed the
danger was in failing to recognize the fiction as fiction because,
according to Vaihinger, the proper use of a fiction ultimately
required one to "drop" the fiction in the final reckoning. 63 This
cryptic notion of dropping the fiction was picked up and ex-
pounded by Fuller in his discussion of the legal fiction.
2. Fuller
Lon Fuller's main work on the legal fiction first appeared in
1930 and 1931 in a series of articles in the Illinois Law Review.6
Those articles were collected and published as a book in a slightly
altered form in 1967 by Stanford University Press. The latter
publication is relied upon here for an understanding of Fuller's
views. However, it must be remembered that it was the state of
law, science, and philosophy of the 1920s that most heavily influ-
enced Fuller. In his introduction to the 1967 version, Fuller ac-
knowledges, "at the time when I began to study the literature of
fictions, the subject was surrounded by the romantic aura of Hans
Vaihinger's The Philosophy of 'As If,' with its mysterious title
promising obscurely some mind-expanding reorientation of human
perspectives. ' ' 65 Fuller goes on to acknowledge that some aspects
,of his work, particularly in reference to physics, may strike the
reader as archaic. However, he asserts that the problems addressed
by fictions remain the same, and he suggests with a tinge of humor
that one interested in fictions "must be tolerant of allegory."6
'
Though greatly influenced by Vaihinger, Fuller put his own
stamp on the fiction. His knowledge of the legal fiction in partic-
ular far outstripped Vaihinger's, and his analysis brought to the
subject an unusual talent for synthesis. 67 He divided his treatment
63. Id. at 127, 227. Vaihinger did not believe that this correction was necessary for
legal fictions but Fuller disagreed and attributed Vaihinger's error to his "lack of intimate
acquaintance with the legal fiction." FULLER, supra note 13, at 117.
64. See supra note 28. See also FULLER, supra note 13, at vii.
65. See FULLER, supra note 13, at viii.
66. Id. at xiii.
67. Fuller not only draws on the work of Vaihinger but also upon the writings of
Bentham, Ihering, Gray, Maine, Blackstone and others. I do not propose to retrace the
history that has already been written so cogently by Fuller. My goal is to take what Fuller
has written and to build upon it in the modern tax context. The space devoted to a
consideration of Vaihinger is explained by his profound effect on Fuller. Though Fuller
may have studied everything he could find that related to the legal fiction, it was Vaihinger
who captured his imagination.
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of the legal fiction into three parts, each titled with a question.
Part One asks: "What is a Legal Fiction?" Part Two asks: "What
Motives Give Rise to the Legal Fiction?" Finally, Part Three asks:
"Is Fiction an Indispensable Instrument of Human Thinking?". I
will draw upon Fuller's work following much the same format.
The reader will observe from the outset that Fuller was more
skeptical about the benefits of legal fictions than his fascination
with The Philosophy of 'As If' might suggest. Like Vaihinger he
believed that our reliance on fictions was inescapable, but he did
not find this an entirely happy circumstance. Throughout Fuller's
work one encounters an essential ambivalence toward the fiction.
a. The Fiction as a Patch in "Law's Fabric of
Theory
In Fuller's view:
[T]he fiction represents the pathology of the law. When all goes
well and established legal rules encompass neatly the social life
they are intended to regulate, there is little occasion for fic-
tions .... Changing the figure, we may liken the fiction to an
awkward patch applied to a rent in the law's fabric of theory. 68
According to Fuller, it is the desire for a comprehensive system
that forces the use of fictions. 69 The fiction is designed to bridge
the gap between concept and reality.70 This explains in part why
its use in the law has often been regarded as shameful yet neces-
sary.71 The very fact that we are called upon to employ a fiction
is an admission of the law's failure to properly express the deeper
principles on which it is based.
b. The Fiction as Metaphor
Like Vaihinger, Fuller asserts that a fiction is neither a truth
nor a lie. It is not a lie because, although it is false, it is not
intended to deceive as to its main thrust. 72 Nor is it an erroneous
68. Id. at viii. Elsewhere he wrote, "the fiction is the cement that is always at hand
to plaster together the weak spots in our intellectual structure." Id. at 52.
69. Id. at x-xi.
70. Id. at xii.
71. Id. at 2. Bentham hated them. Id. Blackstone found them useful but was
apologetic about their use. Id. at 3. Fuller illustrates how readily even its critics fall prey
to the use of the fiction. Id. at 4.
72. Id. at 6. Fuller, however, acknowledges the judgment offered by Henry Sumner
Maine that the purpose of some fictions may be seen as a way to conceal the enlargement
of the authority of the creator of the fiction. Id. at 6-7. Thus, judges may use fictions as
a way to make law while appearing only to find it.
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conclusion because it is adopted with knowledge of its falsity.73 A
fiction is an expedient but false assumption that frequently serves
as "a metaphorical way of expressing a truth.''
74
To convey what is meant by this, let us look to a tax fiction:
the imputed interest rules of section 7872. This section provides,
in part, that for income tax purposes, an employer who makes an
interest free loan to its employee is deemed to have made a payment
of the foregone interest as compensation to the employee and is
also deemed to have received from the employee a payment of the
foregone interest." This would cause the employer to have ordinary
income in the amount of the foregone interest under section 61
and an offsetting salary expense deduction under section 162. The
employee will have compensation income under section 61 in an
amount equal to the foregone interest and may or may not have
an offsetting interest expense deduction under section 163. Whether
the employee is entitled to an interest expense deduction will depend
on how he utilized the loan principal.7 6 None of these imputed
payments between the employer and the employee actually oc-
curred. In this sense the statute is a plain, unvarnished falsehood.
However, on the level of economic theory the statute is thought
to embody a truth. Under this theory, an interest free loan from
employer to employee is the economic equivalent of payment of a
sum of money equal to the foregone interest by the employer to
the employee as compensation, followed by the payment of the
interest by the employee to the employer as interest. 77 By charac-
terizing the loan in this fashion, the statute causes the income tax
consequences to comport with the presumed underlying economic
consequences of an interest free loan. Thus, the apparent falsity
of the statute is deemed to state a more significant underlying
truth that justifies the falsehood.
This example not only illustrates the idea that a legal fiction
is a metaphorical statement of a truth; it is also useful for under-
standing the analytic importance of recognizing the existence of a
fiction. Once we recognize that no actual payments of money have
occurred, we are naturally driven to understand the rationale for
73. Id. at 7.
74. Id. at 10.
75. See I.R.C. § 7872(a)(1) (1988). In the discussion that follows, my description of
this statute will greatly simplify its workings.
76. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163(a), (h) (1988).
77. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1371-73 (1984); see also BITTKER &
MCMAHON, supra note 21, 31.4; MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION,
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 147 (2d ed. 1988).
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the statute's formulation. As Fuller wrote, "[a] doctrine which is
plainly fictitious must seek its justification in considerations of
social and economic policy; a doctrine which is nonfictitious often
has a spurious self-evidence about it. ' 78 When a statute contradicts
reality, we want to know why the statute contradicts reality. In a
case such as section 7872, we may have difficulty in comprehending
the underlying economic theory, but at least our recognition of
the statute's falsity 9 has set us upon the path toward understand-
ing. Taking note of the fiction is the first step toward understand-
ing its purpose or attacking its utility.
c. Recognizing the Fiction
In response to this last point one might be tempted to ask:
So what? Is not the existence of the fiction quite obvious? Why
should anyone ever fail to take note of the fiction? There is some
justice in this observation because the fiction is not intended to
deceive. Thus, typically, no effort is made to conceal its falsity.
The fiction is a falsehood but not a lie. In fact, its objective is to
state a deeper truth. But those persons charged with applying legal
fictions may become so accustomed to the fictions that they forget
about their falsity. We can get into an "a-rule-is-a-rule" mind-set
where the fiction passes us by. In tax law, our fictions can take
such abstract forms that we may have trouble recognizing them as
such. Consider, for example, the estate tax provision section 2036(a).
Is it a tax fiction? I believe so, but others might disagree.
Even those readers who are familiar with section 2036(a) may
be wondering what is meant by calling it a fiction. In order to see
the fiction in section 2036(a), one must first consider the rule of
section 2033. Section 2033 provides that property owned by a
decedent at death is included in her estate for estate tax purposes.80
78. FULLER, supra note 13, at 71.
79. One might question whether in any sense the statute is false as long as the statute
carries an acknowledgement that no money in fact has changed hands. This point will be
discussed infra. However, it is useful to remember that the falsehood in the fiction need
not, and is not, intended to deceive anyone. By saying the statute states a falsehood, we
simply mean that someone standing outside the legal system would consider the fact
established by the statute to be false.
80. I.R.C. § 2033 (1988) provides: "The value of the gross estate shall include the
value of all property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his
death." One of my colleagues has pointed out to me that § 2033 "is itself philosophically
confused, if not a fiction" because a dead person really owns nothing. I think this is the
sort of fiction that is not a legal fiction because the falsehood is not one that a person
standing outside the legal system would be troubled by. Most people would simply assume
that persons die owning whatever they owned the instant before they died.
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This rule may be thought of as the paradigmatic rule for the estate
tax since the tax is an excise on the privilege of transferring
property at death."' That is to say, in general, the estate tax is
intended to tax property owned by the decedent and transferred
by her at her death. In general, section 2036(a) embellishes upon
the rule in section 2033 by providing that property that one trans-
ferred away during life is still included in one's estate if one retains
a life estate in that property. The fiction in section 2036(a), thus,
is that one is treated as the owner at death of a fee simple interest
in property in which one had but a life estate. 2 The analogy upon
which this fiction is based is that property that one has given away
while retaining a life estate is more like continuing to own a fee
simple until death than it is like owning a life estate that came
from someone other than the decedent. In short, section 2036 rests
on an analogy to the paradigm of section 2033.83
Section 2036 is defended by some experts as a means to plug
what is perceived as a loophole in the estate tax. 84 But there is no
loophole in need of plugging unless the analogy between sections
2033 and 2036 is appropriate. On the whole, does section 2036
seem an appropriate "patch applied to a rent in the law's fabric
of theory"? In responding, one can say that the ability to enjoy
property for all of one's life (after having named one's successor
to that enjoyment when one dies) is much like complete ownership
of the property. But it would be foolish to argue that the analogy
is a perfect one. A life tenant who has forfeited any right to
invade a trust corpus and who possesses no right to change the
remainderman is in a far different position than a fee simple owner
of property. The factor that probably tips the scales in favor of
section 2036(a) is that the value of the remainder interest is so
speculative at the time of its transfer that there is little assurance
81. For a brief history of the transfer tax system in this country, see STANLEY S.
SURREY ET AL., FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION 1-12 (Successor ed. 1987).
82. At the moment of death, taking into account the fact of death, the owner of a
life estate has nothing to transfer.
83. I would contend that §§ 2034-44 of the estate tax all rest on analogy to § 2033.
They are all fictions that Congress has judged state a truth at a more abstract level.
84. See, e.g., RICHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFr TAXATION
4.08 (6th ed. 1991). The authors perceive the ability to make transfers of remainders while
retaining a life estate without any estate tax consequence as a tax loophole. Of course, the
transfer of the remainder may be subject to gift tax. Presumably, the loophole derives
from the fact that under actuarial principles a remainder may have little present value. One
could construct a counterargument, however, that no loophole is present under these facts
as long as the remainder is accurately valued. There is a fundamental problem involved in
valuing a future interest, that is, we do not know the future.
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that the gift tax will catch its fair share of tax. This is a policy
consideration extrinsic to the analogy. This, in turn, suggests that
one cannot simply reduce a fiction to its analogical basis in order
to decide whether the fiction is good or bad on the level of tax
policy. But finding the analogy is a useful first step. In the most
general way, we can say that sound analogies make for good
fictions and poor analogies make for bad ones.
d. Legal Fictions Versus Legal Relations
There is a basis for challenging the status of section 2036(a)
as a legal fiction. Such a challenge would derive from the view
that section 2036 simply describes a legal relation between persons,
property, and the estate tax. Indeed, it is possible that Professor
Fuller would not have regarded section 2036(a) as a legal fiction.
This is because Fuller believed "[a] legal relation, accurately de-
scribed and actually enforced, cannot, with utility, be regarded as
a fiction." 5 Fuller doubted that such things as "fictitious legal
rights and duties or supposititious titles" even exist8" because the
only reality such concepts have in the first place is that which the
law grants them. 7 Thus, despite his admiration for Vaihinger,
Fuller disagreed with Vaihinger's characterization of adoption as
a legal fiction. "A legal right reaches objectivity through court
action; we have no other test of its 'reality.' If it meets this test,
it is a real right-whatever may be the protestations of the agency
enforcing it.""8
Legal concepts, Fuller goes on to say, are generally so flexible
and vague in their abstract meanings that rarely may one consider
them to have the requisite falsity to constitute a fiction. 9 After
85. FULLER, supra note 13, at 33. He goes on to add, "[b]ut a description of an
existing and enforced legal relation can be so inadequate and misleading as to deserve the
term fiction." Id. Ultimately it is not clear to me that Fuller actually abides by the
distinction he seeks to draw between "artificial" legal relations and legal fictions. I use
the word artificial here to denote the fact that though the law may consider an adopted
child as if a child of the blood, the lack of actual consanguinity between parent and child
remains unaltered. The transubstantiation is purely a legal one.
86. Id. at 27-31.
87. Fuller contends that legal institutions such as marriage and adoption are not legal
fictions but social realities. Id. at 38. I agree with respect to marriage but not with respect
to adoption. Whatever its origins, marriage as an institution is no longer a metaphor for
some other state. It has its own status separate and distinct from all other human conditions.
When we say an adopted child is treated as if it is a child born of the marriage, however,
we are taking immediate refuge in metaphor.
88. Id. at 29.
89. Id. at 28.
LEGAL FICTIONS
all, how can we view a legal relation as a fiction when there is no
less abstract level at which it is false? In general, Fuller's view
derives from the more basic conclusion that legal relations have
no analogical equivalent outside the law. In other words, the legal
relation does not rest on analogy in the same way that a legal
fiction does.9° Nor does it rest on pretense. As an example, Fuller
points to the concept of legal "title." 9' He illustrates with the
proposition: "Title, as between the parties, had passed to the
mortgagee; as to third parties, title remained in the mortgagor.
'92
Although the statement has a fictive appearance because title is
lodged in two places at once, an apparent impossibility if we were
dealing with a tangible object, the fiction is more apparent than
real. There is no pretense in the proposition that title has a tangible
existence; title merely serves "as a means for grouping together
rather complex legal results in a convenient formula.'9 That title
is lodged in two places at once is a legal fact with no distinct
analogical relationship to any extralegal fact. The concept of title
is merely descriptive of the legal relationship between a person and
property.
In my view, Fuller overstates the case for rejecting legal
relations as a form of legal fiction because legal relations can have
90. A legal relation may have rested on analogy at one time but the analogy may
have long since disappeared. Concepts that some would call fictions may have no analogical
basis. For example, Professor Wani describes "sovereignty" as a fiction. Wani, supra note
11, at 63. I would not describe it as such. I believe describing such a concept as a legal
fiction renders the concept of a legal fiction too amorphous for useful discussion. If
sovereignty has its basis in analogy, it is probably an analogy between the State and God.
This is not an analogy to which I am sympathetic (That "vainest of all legal fictions, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity" is asserted to derive from the axiom that the "King can
do no wrong."). United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COmENTARIs *238). I should point out that Wani finds sover-
eignty, at least as the term is employed in immigration law, a very bad fiction. Thus, in
some sense, he and I are in agreement because I contend that fictions that rest on poor
analogies are likely to be bad fictions. Professor Wani also describes the concept of "entry"
as it is employed in immigration law as a legal fiction. Here I have no difficulty in agreeing
with him. As he describes it, aliens seeking to gain permanent admission to the United
States have different legal rights depending on whether they have "entered" the country.
Wani, supra note 11, at 90. However, the legal concept of "entry" is not identical to the
common meaning of the word. In particular, under the doctrine of entry, one who has
physically "entered" the United States may not have "entered" the country for purposes
of the law. I believe the legal concept of entry is a legal fiction because it has a fact-based
analogical basis, i.e., that one who has entered the United States without complying with
lawful procedure is more like an alien situated outside the United States than he is like a
lawful resident. This may be a bad analogy, but at least it is recognizable as some sort of
analogy.
91. FULLER, supra note 13, at 28-29.
92. Id. at 28.
93. Id.
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a social context as well as a legal context. Moreover, Fuller ac-
knowledges that the distinction between "legal facts" and "extra-
legal facts" is actually one of degree rather than of kind, 94 but
the distinction he seeks to draw between legal relations and legal
fictions derives from that distinction. He seeks to resolve this
problem, unsuccessfully in my opinion, by drawing the further
distinction between statements of fact and statements of legal
relation. 95
He illustrates this distinction by setting out the draft and final
versions of a provision in the German Civil Code. The draft version
provided, "[a]n illegitimate child and its father are unrelated."
96
The final version provided, "[a]n illegitimate child and its father
are not deemed related." '97 Both versions meant the same thing-
that is, there is no legal parental relationship between an illegitimate
child and its biological father. The first version could be viewed
as a deliberate false statement of fact, though without any intent
to deceive. The latter implicitly acknowledges the fact of biological
parenthood but accords that fact no legal effect. Both versions
were intended as negative statements of a legal relation. Does their
slight difference in wording alter this? Fuller seems of two minds
on this point. At the time he sets out the example, he appears to
be saying that the first version is a statement of fact and the
second is a statement of a legal relation, but a few pages later he
contends that the difference between assertive fictions and as-
sumptive fictions is merely one of form. 98 An assertive fiction is
one which iimply states a fact which is false. An assumptive fiction
carries a "grammatical acknowledgment of its falsity." 99 Thus, an
assumptive fiction typically contains the language "as if" or
"deemed" to show that the creator of the fiction was aware of
the falsity.
The distinction between the two statutes concerning illegitimate
children is that one is assertive and one is assumptive. In my view,
both versions of the statute involve a legal fiction because they
both rest on a fact-based analogy that, when stated positively,
94. Id. at 29. Cf. Campbell, supra note 11, at 356-59.
95. FULLER, supra note 13, at 30.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 30, 37. Fuller asserts, correctly I believe: "When we are dealing with
statements that are known to be false, it is a matter of indifference whether the author
adopts a grammatical construction that concedes this falsity, or makes his statement in the
form of a statement of fact." Id. at 37.
99. Id. at 36.
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goes like this: as concerns paternal parenthood, one's illegitimate
child is more like someone else's child than it is like one's own
child. The accepted analogy may be a bad one (as I believe it is),
but it is an analogy all the same. The fiction that comes from this
analogy, then, is that an illegitimate child is not its father's child.
The fiction is present in both forms of the statute.
The counterargument is to contend that neither version states
a legal fiction because neither version has a non-legal context in
which it is false. This lack of non-legal falsity stems from the use
of the phrase "illegitimate child" in stating the analogy and in
the rule proceeding from the analogy. The phrase carries with it
a legal context whenever it is employed. It cannot be employed in
a non-legal context. In part my response is to say that it is the
resulting contradiction of the facts which distinguishes the fiction.
However we state the fiction, the ultimate effect is to permit a
father to point to his child and rightly (in the eyes of the law)
say: "that is not my child." A second response is to say that
concepts such as illegitimacy and adoption, though legalistic in
nature, still possess a non-legal context because of their wide
acceptance among the general populace. Illegitimacy has a social
meaning as well as a legal meaning.
Returning now to section 2036(a), I would suggest that it is a
legal fiction because it is best understood by reference to an analogy
between a retained life estate and outright ownership, and because
the rule that comes from that analogy is false under a common
sense view of the matter (that rule being that one is treated as
owning and transferring a remainder at a point in time when one
does not in fact own or transfer that remainder). Obviously,
however, it is also a statement of legal relations. Moreover, even
my analogy is couched in terms ("life estate" and "ownership")
that may be characterized as descriptive of legal relations.
The legal and non-legal worlds shade into one another by
degrees. In the area of overlap, legal fictions and legal relations
may coincide. A statement of legal relation may involve a legal
fiction or it may not. A statement of legal relation that is best
understood as the conversion of a fact-based analogy into an
absolute rule may involve a legal fiction. It is a legal fiction if,
by converting the analogy into a rule, we have asserted something
that is false from a non-legal perspective. Thus, for instance, I
believe the rule that an adopted child is legally equivalent to one's
natural child is a borderline legal fiction because it is best under-
stood by reference to a factual analogy such as "one's adopted
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child is more like one's own child than it is like someone else's
child." I say "borderline" because I believe there would be some
ambiguity in how non-lawyers would understand the assertion
deriving from such an analogy that "an adopted child is its parents'
child." 100 The legal fiction in the adoption rule may be "dying." 10
On the other hand, I believe that the concept of title is not a legal
fiction because it is best understood by reference to abstract prin-
ciples of law rather than by a factual analogy. 02 Admittedly, the
distinction in any given case is one of degree. Moreover, it still
may force us to distinguish between legal facts and extralegal facts,
and, as Fuller asserted, this can be exceedingly difficult. But at
least the effort to identify the analogy supporting the fiction
possesses some practical utility as a means to examine the legal
fiction from a policy perspective. In order to judge the quality of
the fiction, we can begin by considering the quality of the analogy
that brought it to life. As noted earlier, in the most general way,
we may say that good analogies make for good fictions, and bad
analogies make for bad fictions. 03
100. Which set of parents, biologic or adoptive, would a non-lawyer believe were being
referred to? Probably either. Moreover, even if the proffered statement were, "an adopted
child is its adoptive parents' child," a non-lawyer would not necessarily disagree. The non-
lawyer would understand that no assertion of biological parenthood was being made. This
is because the word "adopted" carries with it the implicit assertion of a legal context. The
non-lawyer would be inclined to discard the potential falsehood of the assertion and consider
the statement as true in its intended sense. This view of adoption is consonant with the
discussion of how fictions "die." See infra part II.B.2.e.
101. In a society where multiple marriages verge on being the norm and where adoptions
are commonplace, it may not be clear what the phrase "my child" means in the non-legal
context. For example, if I point to a child on the playground and say, "that's my child,"
would you automatically assume that I was claiming biological parenthood? If the child
were Asian and I were White, would you assume I was lying?
102. If we describe title as a "bundle of rights" we tend to mix the two. But of the
two ideas expressed, "rights" has more consequence than "bundle."
103. In my view, the adoption analogy is a good analogy and produces a good fiction.
The analogy is a good one because the social relationship between an adoptive parent and
her adopted child closely resembles the social relationship between a parent and her
biological child. Over time, the bond between the adopted child and its parent is likely to
mirror the bond between a natural child and its parent. The fiction is a good one because,
by treating the adopted child as a natural child, the law reinforces the positive development
of a close relationship and emphasizes the social responsibility that the adoptive parent has
assumed for the adopted child.
In my view, the illegitimacy analogy is a bad analogy and the fiction flowing from it
is a bad fiction. The analogy is a poor one because it understates the causal connection
between the child's birth and the biological father's relationship with the child's mother.
The fiction is a bad fiction because it deemphasizes the moral and social responsibility the
father has to that child. I see no justice in allowing the father to avoid his obligations to
his illegitimate child.
LEGAL FICTIONS
e. The Life Cycle of the Legal Fiction
Fuller asserted that fictions possess an organic quality. That
is, they may evolve or die in the course of time. They may
disappear as a result of rejection or of acceptance. Disappearance
through acceptance occurs because the fiction derives from the
meanings given words, and those meanings can change. The fiction
is a linguistic phenomena because whether a statement is true or
not depends on the standards of language we are applying to it.104
Because fictions are commonly metaphorical usages of words with
more concrete meanings, they die when the metaphor is no longer
perceived as a metaphor. 05 Thus, according to Fuller, live fictions
die with changes in the meanings of words and with the shape of
the surrounding law. 1°6 This view must be reconciled with the
principle that fictions are falsities embodying some other principle
at a metaphorical level. If the metaphor disappears, does the fiction
then become a simple falsehood? Not at all. When the metaphor
dies, it is because the previously metaphorical meaning of the
fiction has replaced the previously false meaning as the chief
meaning of the words employed to state the former fiction. Thus,
the abstraction indirectly stated in the fiction has replaced the
apparent falsehood as the more definite and paramount meaning
of the language employed. According to this view, then, the fiction
dies by becoming victorious.
The distinction between live fictions and victorious dead fic-
tions is important because, as discussed later, while a fiction
continues as a fiction it is most usefully employed when it is
recognized as a fiction. A fiction does not die in the sense of
ceasing to be false just because we fail to recognize it. It dies
when the falsehood "drops out" and the underlying principle it
supports becomes its first meaning. 0 7 In a metaphorical sense,
proper use of a legal fiction always involves the death of the
104. FULLER, supra note 13, at 11-12.
105. Id. at 15-16.
106. Id. at 14-15.
107. Fuller asserts that one can tell if a fiction is live or dead by asking whether it
involves a "pretense." Id. at 19. He goes on to state, "[t]he death of a fiction may indeed
be characterized as a result of the operation of the law of economy of effort in the field
of mental processes." Id. Thus, he concludes, fictions may be eliminated not only by
rejection but also by redefinition. Redefinition involves defining words to mean literally
what we metaphorically intend. Id. at 19-20. As an example, he reminds us that the word
"person" once meant "mask." Its application to human beings was at first metaphorical.
Now, of course, that metaphorical usage has become its primary usage. The metaphor has
died. Id.
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fiction. A less cryptic way to state this last proposition is to say
that while a fiction is alive it should be applied with a consciousness
of its falsity and with an intention to give expression to its un-
derlying truth. This is what Vaihinger and Fuller called "dropping
the fiction." This notion of dropping the fiction will be addressed
more fully in Part V.
III. WHY DOES THE TAX CODE EMPLOY LEGAL
FICTIONS?
A. The Connection Between the Legal Fiction and Pre-
Existing Law
One might question why we should employ fictions if their
proper application involves dropping the fiction. There is no simple
answer to this question. The immediate motive for the creation of
any fiction is a desire on the part of the fiction's creator to change
existing law. But one can change existing law without indulging in
legal fictions. Why does a lawmaker choose to employ a fiction
in changing the law? The answer lies in the peculiar way in which
the fiction operates. The fiction changes existing law by indirectly
expanding or contracting the range of application of other, usually
pre-existing, rules of law. 0 8 For example, section 7872 constructs
transfers of money between a lender and a borrower, but section
7872 does not itself determine what tax consequences arise from
the monetary transfers it creates. Instead, by creating those trans-
fers, section 7872 activates other pre-existing rules which operate
with respect to the constructive transfers in the same fashion as
they would operate with respect to actual transfers of money in
like circumstances.'0
9
108. "Any rule creating a fiction is necessarily parasitic on another rule, since a fiction
has a purpose and effect only if there is another rule whose range of application will be
changed by the fiction's existence." Campbell, supra note 11, at 366. Rather than parasitic,
I would characterize the fiction as having a symbiotic relationship with the rule it modifies.
The two rules work together to achieve some (hopefully) desirable aim. One might also
describe the fiction as a catalyst because it only creates the conditions for change without
directly participating in that change.
109. In effect, when we engage in a fiction, we redefine reality to comport with existing
law as a method of changing the law to meet new realities or to meet new insights into
reality. This method of adapting the law to changing circumstances and perceptions is saved
from absurdity by its underlying rationality. As noted earlier, when used properly the legal
fiction is a rule of law embodying an unconcealed falsehood at one level and a deeper
truth at another more important level. The falsehood is often made necessary because of
the pre-existing structure of the law, and is justified (if it is justified) by the deeper
underlying truth contained within the falsehood.
LEGAL FICTIONS
The fiction is motivated by a wish to change the operation of
pre-existing law without changing the language of pre-existing
law. 10 A fiction does this by contradicting reality (viewed from a
non-legal perspective) by creating a fact or destroying a fact in
order to make the facts of a specific case comport with (or fall
outside) the law antedating the fiction. But why does it seek to
make pre-existing law apply (or not apply) to the new case? Because
the fiction's creator has judged that the new case is like (or unlike)
the cases addressed by pre-existing law and, therefore, should be
decided in the same way (or differently) from the cases addressed
by pre-existing law. For example, the doctrine of constructive
receipt creates the fact of receipt in order to make applicable to
a case outside its apparent ambit the rule of cash accounting that
one reports income when one receives it."' Why was the doctrine
of constructive receipt created? Because the new case is deemed to
be within the underlying but unstated principles of the pre-existing
law. Thus, the constructive receipt fiction is an attempt, by way
of metaphor, to pull within pre-existing law that which was in-
tended to be covered by that law but which was not (at least as
judged by the common, natural or expected meanings of the words
employed in the pre-existing law). 1
12
In the judicial context, it is easy to see a motive to employ
the fiction. In the common view, a judge is not supposed to make
law, but rather to find it. In doing so, she is also supposed to
"do justice." The fiction contrives to do justice even when the
pre-existing law seems inadequate to the task while also permitting
the judge to pay obeisance to her designated role of law finder.
But why do legislators, who are licensed to make law, also employ
the fiction? In the end, the motives of the legislator are not so
different from the motives of the judge.
110. As Fuller put it, "[g]enerally a fiction is intended to escape the consequences of
an existing, specific rule of law." FULLER, supra note 13, at 53. Campbell says:
The reason for the existence of fictions follows from their nature. As a specific
legal technique they are used to give any rule of law a wider, or narrower, ambit
than it would have if applied non-fictitiously, while at the same time preserving
the rule's original form and the meaning of its terms.
Campbell, supra note 11, at 365.
111. See Hornung v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 428 (1967); Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a), -2
(1954).
112. Fuller defends the use of fictions from the criticism that the law should be stated
directly rather than by the less precise means of metaphor, by saying "[m]etaphor is the
traditional device of persuasion. Eliminate metaphor from the law and you have reduced
the power to convince and convert." FULLER, supra note 13, at 24.
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B. The Conservative Nature of the Fiction
Fuller identifies a number of motives for the creation of legal
fictions. The common denominator in all these motives is that they
are essentially conservative. He states that the motive for using
the fiction as the means for change may rest in "policy," "emo-
tional conservatism" or in "conservatism of convenience."'' 3 The
motive of policy refers to the desire of a judge to change the law
while conforming his decision to the outward forms of the law.
This was the fiction which Jeremy Bentham so despised because
he saw it as intended to deceive." 4 The motive of emotional
conservatism concerns the desire to change the law while clinging
to the old forms in order to achieve a sense of stability and
continuity with the past." 5 The motive of convenience concerns
the use of the fiction to obtain a desired result without the necessity
of overhauling the whole system of rules and without the necessity
of re-educating all the lawyers and judges as to that new system." 6
Fuller also notes that the fiction may proceed from "intellectual
conservatism"; that is, it may arise because one does not know
how else to state the new principle one is applying." 7 (This matter
of intellectual conservatism will be addressed in Part IV.) Finally,
according to Fuller, fictions may also serve as "a convenient
shorthand" where we wish to avoid spelling things out." 8
C. The Particular Utility of the Fiction in Tax Law
The tax fiction, I believe, partakes of all these motives. When
a fiction is properly drawn, it is a refinement in our thinking
about the law. But usually it does not involve a radical change in
existing paradigms or principles. Instead, by its nature, the fiction
builds upon the existing law. Thus, the fiction is a conservative
device for change, and that conservative aspect of the fiction makes
it particularly appropriate for use in the tax context.
113. Id. at 56-57.
114. Bentham regarded the legal fiction as a contemptible stratagem because he saw
it as a way of making law while pretending only to follow existing law. See Samek, supra
note 11, at 296-99; Soifer, supra note 11, at 877-78.
115. FULLER, supra note 13, at 58.
116. Id. at 59-63.
117. Id. at 63-70.
118. Id. at 81.
LEGAL FICTIONS
1. Taxation as a Politically and Economically Sensitive
Matter
Taxation is a politically and economically sensitive topic. Rad-
ical changes in the amounts or sources of taxes are likely to be
viewed with distrust by the public and the government alike.
Moreover, since the major federal taxes are likely to intersect the
lives of most of the working public, a dominant impulse with
respect to the main provisions of those major taxes is likely to be
one of maintaining the status quo. Fictions allow one to chip away
at the edges of the law without altering its main shape and this
sort of incremental change is well suited to the sensitive aspect of
tax law.
2. Tax Professionals and the Legal Fiction
The conservative aspect of the fiction also means that tax
professionals are likely to find it an appealing mechanism for
change. As a system of rules grows more complex, those persons
whose livelihood depends on their ability to work with those rules
have greater incentive to resist radical change because of the
amount of relearning involved. The federal income tax, in partic-
ular, has achieved the level of complexity that is likely to breed
resistance to further change in those who have already invested
long years in mastering the existing law. The fiction permits one
to change the law without uprooting or amending existing provi-
sions and without overturning the existing understanding of those
provisions. 1 9 This means that as the law changes, the background
and perspective already attained by tax professionals continues to
be relevant and useful, and the effort involved in assimilating those
changes is reduced. The attraction of the fiction, then, for tax
professionals derives from its respect for existing law.
3. Tax Fictions and Tax Formalism
Another aspect of the fiction that makes it particularly suitable
for -use in tax law is its inherent suitability for those rule systems,
such as tax, where there is both a strict regard for the letter of
119. Of course, in a sense the fiction does change the existing rules and their meanings
by extending or reducing their current applications. But it does so in a way that is less
traumatic.
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the law' 20 and a desire to treat individual cases fairly. The legal
fiction is a legal formalist's 121 device for doing justice in cases that
do not fit the formal language of the pre-existing law. Consider,
for instance, section 2518, the disclaimer provision. In effect, the
disclaimer rules provide that a refusal of a gift or bequest will
cause the gift or bequest to be treated as if it was never made.
The fact-based analogy on which this fiction rests is that a refused
bequest is more like no bequest than it is like a bequest. 2  The
effect of the disclaimer rules is to override other rules that would
otherwise cause a gift or bequest to have some specific tax con-
sequence. Thus, for instance, the disclaimer rules may create the
fiction that a husband was not bequeathed property by his wife
and in this way avoid the effects of the rule that would require
the decedent's estate to take the marital deduction for such a
bequest.'23 In this way, the decedent's estate may take advantage
of the unified credit which would otherwise be lost.
24
120. I am speaking in generalities here. There are many notable examples dating at
least as far back as Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), of courts taking a non-
literal view of the Code. See Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation,
49 U. CHI. L. REV. 859 (1982) (reviewing BORIS I. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GIFTS (1981)); Joshua D. Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance and Income Measurement,
87 MICH. L. REV. 365, 385-88 (1988).
121. What is legal formalism? I accept the view expressed by Professor Frederick
Schauer. He said:
At the heart of the word "formalism," in many of its numerous uses, lies the
concept of decisionmaking according to rule. Formalism is the way in which rules
achieve their "ruleness" precisely by doing what is supposed to be the failing of
formalism: screening off from a decisionmaker factors that a sensitive decision-
maker would otherwise take into account.
Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988).. Formalists treat rules as
having concrete and specific meanings that force some outcomes and exclude others. It is
difficult to think of any area of the law that is more formalistic in this sense than tax.
122. See William P. Streng, Estate Planning, 11-11th, Tax. Mgmt. Est. Gifts & Tr.
Part. (BNA) No. 11-1 lth, at A-154 (1991). In some contexts, "[t]he effect of the disclaimer
is to treat the disclaimant as having predeceased the decedent." Id. at A-155. The present
disclaimer rules embodied in § 2518 are an attempt to establish uniform rules out of various
principles deriving from case law and earlier statutory rules. The courts early recognized
that it made no sense to give effect for tax purposes to a gift that was refused by the
intended donee. After all, the effect of the donee's refusal was to cause the donor to retain
ownership of the property. If there is no completed gift there should be no gift tax liability.
It might be suggested that because there was no completed gift, the disclaimer rules do not
involve a fiction. My reason for considering the disclaimer rules as a legal fiction is that
from a non-legal peripective there was, in fact, a gift or bequest. For a discussion of some
of the history of disclaimers, see RICHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT
TAXATION 9-8 (3rd ed. 1974). -
123. See I.R.C. § 2056 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). The marital deduction is mandatory
in most cases of property left by a decedent to the decedent's spouse.
124. See I.R.C. § 2010 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). The unified credit is applied against
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The reason one may say that this is a formalist's device for
doing justice is that the disclaimer rule permits us to continue to
interpret all of the existing rules in a literal fashion without allow-
ing that formalism to operate unfairly with respect to disclaimed
gifts or bequests. Without a rule like section 2518, a court inter-
preting the marital deduction provision in cases where a spouse
has refused to accept a marital bequest could still reach a fair
result by treating a marital bequest as a nullity, but to do so, the
court would have to say that the bequeathed property did not
"pass" from the decedent to the surviving spouse. 25 But in a very
formal sense, the property "passed" and then was "passed" back.
Thus, to reach a result that most would regard as the fair result,
the court would have to disregard the formalities of the law.
The disclaimer rules permit us to continue to have regard for
the formalities while dealing fairly with the present exigencies. The
tax fiction that a refused bequest is no bequest comports with one
of the tax code's basic underlying principles; that is, that tax
consequences should be determined by the economic substance of
a transaction rather than by the form in which it presents itself.
Distinguishing between substance and form is, of course, often
quite problematic. Indeed one may question whether the distinction
is always viable. 12 6 Even so, it is one which we persist in making.
27
Economically, a disclaimed gift or bequest has no effect, and
section 2518 is an effort to cause the tax law to mirror that lack
of economic effect.
28
a tax liability that in turn is derived by applying the tax rate to the value of the taxable
estate. If the marital deduction reduces or eliminates the taxable estate, there may not be
sufficient tax liability to absorb the credit. This is important because the credit can serve
to insulate property from tax as it passes from one generation to the next. The marital
deduction, on the other hand, does not insulate the property from being taxed in the
surviving spouse's estate. Thus, by wasting the credit in the estate of the first spouse to
die, the ultimate tax burden on the combined estates of the two spouses is increased to the
detriment of their posterity.
125. Section 2056(a) provides a marital deduction for "the value of any interest in
property which passes or has passed" to the surviving spouse. Section 2056(c) defines
"passing" to include all sorts of transfers of property interests from the decedent to her
spouse. The statute seems to assume acceptance by the donee spouse.
126. See Isenbergh, supra note 120, at 879.
127. See, e.g., JOSEPH DODGE, THE Looc OF TAX, 264-73 (1989).
128. One might contest the assertion that a disclaimer has no economic effect by
pointing out that the disclaimer of a bequest will have the economic effect of causing the
property to pass to someone else, usually either a contingent beneficiary or the residuary
beneficiary. Can a dislaimer ever truly be said to have no economic effect? Perhaps not.
But recall that it is in the nature of a legal fiction to take an analogy and convert it into
an absolute rule. This conversion results in a falsehood. We are forced by pre-existing
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In an area such as constitutional law where rules are fewer
and where practitioners and judges apply what rules there are in
a highly purposive fashion, there may be less need for fictions. In
less formalistic areas of law, those persons obliged to make the
law work are asking functional, purposive questions in the first
place. In the area of tax, on the other hand, the inclination is to
seek a rule for everything. We are concerned with forms and
believe that the forms make a difference. Thus, we take existing
forms seriously and are loathe to change their meanings even when
they seem to lead to an inappropriate outcome in a particular case.
The fiction allows us to accommodate our view of the proper
outcome with our wish to preserve the existing form.
4. Tax Fictions, Tax Complexity, and the Matter of
Convenience
The simple convenience of the fiction is also particularly
attractive in tax law. In a body of law- as interconnected and
complex as the Internal Revenue Code, changes one place in the
law often impact many other provisions. By employing the fiction,
the law can be changed without the necessity of making technical
amendments to other provisions. For example, the disclaimer rules
of section 2518 change the operation of many other provisions of
the estate tax, gift tax, and generation skipping transfer tax without
necessitating changes in the existing language of those rules. If we
sought to accomplish more directly the same end result as is
brought about by section 2518, it would be necessary to change
each of the individual rules which it effects. Thus, for instance, it
would be necessary to amend the marital deduction rules to provide
that only bequests from one spouse to another that are "accepted"
by the donee spouse qualify for the marital deduction. The tax
fiction is the easy way out of the labyrinth. Like a new piece in
a puzzle, it changes our perspective without eliminating what came
before it.
The motives that bring about tax fictions may be described in
various ways, but in some fashion they all relate to the essentially
conservative desire to connect the new with the old or the unknown
with the known. The tax fiction is an accommodation between
what we said yesterday and what we believe today.
dichotomies in the law to make an absolute choice between treating a disclaimed bequest
like any other bequest or like no bequest. When we judge that a disclaimed bequest is
more like no bequest than an actual bequest, then we must opt for the fiction that the
disclaimed bequest never occurred.
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IV. IS THE TAX FICTION AN INDISPENSABLE
MECHANISM OF TAX LAW?
The tax fiction seems to be with us for some time to come.
Indeed, it appears to be flourishing.129 Beginning as a device of
judges and the common law, 30 it has evolved into a common
statutory mechanism in the tax law.' This is no accident. It has
already been suggested that the legal fiction is particularly suited
for use in tax law. Tax lends itself to formalism. The fiction is a
formalistic device because the need for it arises out of the perceived
inflexibility of pre-existing law. The tremendous elaborative com-
plexity of tax law is also particularly suited to the employment of
legal fictions. We have so many rules that any refinement of our
129. It is likely that one will find a tax fiction whenever a tax statute employs the
word "deemed" or the phrase "as if." See H.R. REP. No. 651, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1982) ("The word 'deemed' is used where a legal fiction, or what may in some cases be
a legal fiction, is intended."). In a recent computer search I found that the word "deemed"
is employed in over 300 code sections. The phrase "as if" is also employed in the Code.
See, e.g., § l(g) ("certain unearned income of minor children taxed as if parent's income").
"As if" is not, however, a searchable phrase in LEXIS. Soifer asserts that the use of legal
fictions (or our perception of their use) has increased over the last half-century. Soifer,
supra note 11, at 874-76. "In our post-realist world . . . our sense is that legal fictions are
not some small, awkward patch but rather the whole seamless cloth of the law." Id. at
876. I have tried to set forth a view of the fiction that treats it as a sufficiently specific
form of rule to warrant specific attention. Nonetheless, at times I wonder if lines can truly
be drawn in an area with so many shades of difference.
130. Some tax commentators argue that the widely employed substance-over-form
doctrine is a tax fiction. See Cliff & Cohen, supra note 11, at 38. I would be more inclined
to describe it as an underlying paradigm justifying the use of legal fictions. Perhaps this
is what Messrs. Cliff and Cohen meant because they go on to describe § 482 as a legal
fiction giving expression to the substance-over-form doctrine. Id. at 39.
131. Tax fictions run the gamut from the innocuous to the dramatic. For example,
some minor tax fictions are found in § 1223 (the tacking of holding periods), and § 168
(e.g. § 168(b)(4) (assumption of zero salvage value for depreciation purposes)); § 168(d)
(the applicable conventions establishing when property is put into service for depreciation
purposes). Of more consequence is the constructive dividend rule in § 305(c) or the fiction
in § 1014(b)(6) granting the basis step-up to the surviving spouse in her half of the
community property upon the death of her spouse. It is arguable that the whole of § 1014
is a legal fiction, founded on an analogy between a beneficiary of a decedent's estate and
one who bought the property from the decedent for its date of death fair market value.
.Certainly, to view § 1014 from this perspective is to begin to expose its indefensibility on
a tax theory plane. However, I believe § 1014 so plainly represents a political choice as to
render discussion of it as a tax fiction largely irrelevant. For a criticism of § 1014, see
U.S. TREASURY DEPT., TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, 91St CONG., 1St SESS., pt. 3,
331-40 (1969), reprinted in FRANK E.A. SANDER & DAVID WESTFALL, READINGS IN FEDERAL
TAXATION 542-551 (1970). As discussed later in the text, the non-recognition provisions
could be regarded as tax fictions. The same could be said of the anti-tax shelter rules such
as §§ 465 and 469. Moreover, any provision that employs the term "deemed" or the phrase
"as if" may well be a tax fiction. See supra notes 128-29.
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thinking in how the system should work could necessitate mass
changes in the rules. But the fiction changes the operation of
existing rules without changing their forms or meanings. Thus, a
fiction can change the way the law works without changing the
pre-existing structure of the law. The more elaborate the pre-
existing structure of the law, the more useful it is to employ legal
fictions to effect changes in that structure. But recognizing that
use of the fiction is particularly convenient in tax law is not the
same as saying that tax fictions are indispensable or unavoidable.
Must we employ the fiction in tax law, or do we simply choose
to employ it?
A. Putting Aside the Question of Whether the Fiction is
Inherent to Human Thought
One could contend that the legal fiction is inescapable as a
device of the law because, as Vaihinger believed, fictions are
inherent to human thought . 3 2 For example, any attempt to classify
or categorize may be viewed as the creation of a fiction because
generalizations are always false when applied to some individuals
within the supposed class they describe.'33 Yet without classifica-
132. Fuller embraced Vaihinger's idea that the use of fictions is a fundamental trait
of human reason. FULLER, supra note 13, at 94. In order to deal with the world we are
obliged to reduce reality into something we can comprehend. Fuller suggested that the
processes by which our minds capture reality are of two types. The first he called "the
process of simplification and organization." Id. at 106. The second he called "the process
of converting new experiences into familiar terms." Id. The process of simplification and
organization' often involves the use of what Vaihinger called "neglective fictions," those
where we disregard certain elements in a fact situation. Id. The assumption that man is an
economic animal is an example of such a fiction. Id. These are useful but dangerous. One
must keep in mind the purpose for which the fiction is employed. The neglected facts may
be unimportant in one context and of major importance in another. Id. at 107. Other
examples of the mind's tendency to simplify by classifying and categorizing have already
been mentioned. The mind has an "inveterate hang" toward "organized simplicity." Id.
at Ill,. The second process, "the process of converting new experiences into familiar
terms," is addressed in this article's main text.
133. Fuller wrote:
The most elementary thought cannot proceed without classifications, yet Vaihinger'
regards classifications as fictions. They are fictions for two distinct reasons. (1)
We treat the class as a distinct entity, though it is composed of individuals that
vary among themselves. We speak of the class 'man' though it is impossible to
think of a man in the abstract. If we visualize a man, he must be black or white,
short or tall. Yet our abstract man must be a black-white, short-tall man. (2)
'Natural' classes rarely, if ever, exist. We are constantly encountering borderline
cases which upset our classifications. We were beginning to feel that 'man'
formed a natural class when someone dug up Pithecanthropus erectus. Even
those qualities which seem so opposed that they are used as synonyms for the




tions and categories much of human speech and thought becomes
impossible. 34 In the tax context, it is clear that classifying and
categorizing are ongoing processes. Some of those classifications
have a distinctly fictional caste. '3s But it was said almost from the
134. Fuller asserted that the postulating of classes is a way of simplifying and organizing
our thoughts, and that language does this almost automatically. Id. at 109.
135. Consider, for instance, the passive loss rules of § 469 introduced into tax law in
1986. Those rules create a new category of tax losses based on who is entitled to benefit
by them. See I.R.C. § 469(c)-(d) (1988). In general, the statute provides that a taxpayer's
passive loss is her net loss from a trade or business in which she does not "materially
participate." See Michael A. Oberst, The Passive Activity Provisions-A Tax Policy
Blooper, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 641, 646 (1988) (the question of what constitutes material
participation has been addressed at some length in Treasury Regulation § 1.469-5T). The
legal effect of calling a loss passive is to deny it deductibility against non-passive income.
I.R.C. § 469(a) (1988). It would be difficult to argue that passive losses represent a natural
category or classification of losses. The concept of a passive loss is an artificial mental
construct. Vaihinger would have called it a fiction. But is it a legal fiction? The answer
depends on the level of abstraction one is willing to accept in defining fictions.
Fuller might have contended that the concept of passive losses lacks the requisite falsity
to be a fiction. After all, the concept of a passive loss is merely descriptive of a legal
relation between a taxpayer and an item of deduction. By defining a passive loss in a
certain way the statute has called it into being. The statute does not contradict (directly,
at least) what we know as reality; it simply redescribes it in a fashion different from our
accustomed fashion. One could say, however, that § 469 does contain a falsehood in the
sense that it contradicts more basic notions of what it means to have a "loss." Moreover,
under the approach offered in this article for distinguishing legal fictions from mere legal
relations, the question is whether the concept of a passive loss is derived from a fact-based
analogy. We could say' that it is. The analogy upon which the passive loss rules are based
is that passive losses are more like unrealized losses than real economic losses. Indeed, an
analogy to unrealized or artificial losses is probably a basis for all of the loss denial
provisions. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 267 (1988) (denying losses realized on sales to related persons)
and I.R.C. § 465 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (denying losses in excess of the taxpayer's at risk
amount). Based on' that analogy to unrealized losses, § 469 prevents the current deduction
of passive losses (against non-passive income) until a later time when they are deemed
actually realized, such as when the interest in the passive activity is sold. See I.R.C. §
469(g)(1) (1988). This analogy may be a bad analogy, and § 469 may be bad fiction. But
that is not the same as saying it does not rest on an analogy. Nor is it the same as saying
it is no fiction.
The use of fictional classifications in tax law is not restricted to those that protect the
treasury. Most of the income deferral provisions may be viewed as tax fictions based on
an analogy to unrealized gains. For instance, § 1031 grants gain recognition deferral with
respect to exchanges of "like kind" business or investment property. I.R.C. § 1031(a) (1988
& Supp 1990). The provision is often justified on the grounds that gains from such exchanges
are only "paper gains." Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Section 1031: We Don't Need Another
Hero, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 397, 407 (1987). The underlying analogy might be stated in this
way: a like kind exchange is more like no exchange than it is like a real exchange. Again,
we might say the analogy is a bad one. Bad analogies may make for bad fictions, but they
make fictions nonetheless.
How useful is it to think of provisions such as §§ 469 and 1031 as legal fictions? It
may be suggested that by giving the legal fiction such a broad definition it is rendered
meaningless as an analytical tool. My response is that each case must be judged on its own
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outset of this article that not every rule that is over-inclusive or
under-inclusive is a legal fiction, and it is best not to challenge
that analysis at this late stage. The legal fiction shades into other
forms of rules by degrees, but the concern throughout this article
is to deal with it in its more distinctive variations. In this context,
the question becomes whether the more overt form of legal fiction
that has been the subject of this article is an indispensable mech-
anism of tax law.
B. The Unavoidable Analogy
On occasion the use of fictions appears inescapable. This is
due, in part, to the fact that we are continually faced with new
situations. 3 6 Our usual method of coming to grips with new situa-
tions involves converting new experiences into the terms of those
experiences with which we are already familiar. Fuller uses the
example of a boy who, upon first seeing a horse, called it a "big
dog.' 37 This, of course, is an example of reasoning by analogy.
As previously suggested, analogies are fundamental tools of law-
yerly thinking."' Analogies are also the basis for legal fictions.
merits. There is nothing magical or sacred about the legal fiction. "Reasoning by analogy
is said to be the basic way we 'think like a lawyer."' Anthony D'Amato, Pragmatic
Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 148, 184 (1990) (citing J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions,
99 YALE L.J. 1669, 1671 (1990) (reviewing JOHN M. ELLIS, AGAINST RECONSTRUCTION (1989))
and RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, 86-93 (1990)). If in a given
case it helps us to understand a rule's purpose or function by examining its analogical
connections to the real world, then it may be useful to think of that rule as a fiction. This
is a natural consequence of any purposive theory of legal interpretation. It is not demeaning
to describe a rule of law as involving a legal fiction. The fiction is not a falsification in a
moral or philosophical sense, but rather it is an adaptation of the human mind to the
intransigent crudity of language and the ineluctable modality of life.
If we dealt with reality as it is, in its crude, unorganized form, we should be
helpless. Instead of that, our minds have the capacity for altering, simplifying,
rearranging reality. This process of elaboration and alteration is-to preserve the
organic simile-but the sign of a good mental digestion; it indicates the vigor
and capacity of our minds.
FULLER, supra note 13, at 104:
136. Fuller reached this same conclusion about legal fictions generally. FULLER, supra
note 13, at 94. Samek echoed this view. He argued that fictions are valuable to the law
because of "their ability to stretch its criteria .... [They make us] see the doctrine in a
new light." Samek, supra note 11, at 313.
137. FULLER, supra note 13, at 113.
138. Vaihinger stressed that "human thought must always proceed by analogy and
that analogies must always be taken from an existing stock of experience." Id. Does an
analogy represent alteration of reality? Fuller says it need not but that in practice, it
generally does because we give too much credence to our analogies. Id. at 115 ("A
metaphorical element taints all our concepts.").
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The fiction may be the only appropriate device for resolving
a case fairly because of the way in which the fiction permits us
to think about things we are only beginning to understand by
comparing them to things with which we are already familiar.'3 9
This is illustrated by section 7872. Most of us can understand an
arrangement between an employer and its employee in which the
employer loans money to the employee at a reasonable rate of
interest. If the employer later pays a sum to the employee equal
to the amount of interest owed by the employee, we could under-
stand that the employee has compensation income and the employer
has a deductible expense. And if the employee then makes his
required interest payment to the employer, we could understand
that the employer has interest income and the employee may have
a deductible expense. But in earlier, less economically sophisticated
days, few of us, without any prodding, would have seen an eco-
nomic equivalence to all those things in an interest free loan from
the employer to the employee. 14° Section 7872 bridges the gap
between our less sophisticated past and our increasing understand-
ing of the time value of money. In that sense, the fiction is a way
of connecting the known with the unknown.
141
Is there a non-fictitious way to describe the appropriate income
tax consequences of an interest free loan? I, at least, would be
hard pressed to find it. For the time being, the fiction of section
7872 may be the only way to express our vision of what constitutes
economic justice. Though it is probable that any fiction can be
avoided by a sufficiently radical shift in paradigms, such radical
shifts in paradigms are not everyday events. The fiction helps us
to get by until new insights show us a better way.
C. Pragmatism and the Fiction
At times, there are only two strategies for avoiding the em-
ployment of fictions. We can either change or eliminate the existing
139. Fuller believed that "[t]he function of the fiction, as affecting an adjustment
between new situations and an existing conceptual structure, has a parallel in the methods
of the natural scientist." Id. at 71. "The motive of the scientific fiction is the same as
that of the historical legal fiction proceeding from intellectual considerations; i.e., a new
situation is made 'thinkable' by converting it into familiar terms." Id. at 72.
140. The principle of § 7872 may seem obvious to many. However, as one charged
with teaching it to intelligent people with many years of education already behind them, I
can testify that it strikes most people as much less than obvious.
141. By the same token, one may well wonder whether in years to come someone will
offer a new insight into interest free loans that shows that § 7872 reflected only a partial
understanding of the economic significance of such loans. If this occurs, we may then say
that § 7872 served as only an intermediate analogical step in bridging the gap between the
known and the unknown.
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rule that motivates us to resort to the fiction, or we can accept
the injustice that comes from employing the existing rule in the
absence of the fiction. For example, we could forego employing
the fiction of constructive ownership in the context of non-liqui-
dating corporate distributions if we were willing either to eliminate
the distinction between dividends and redemptions or if we were
willing to ignore that family members often function as an eco-
nomic unit. 42 In a pragmatic sense, neither of those strategies may
be available. Elimination of the dividend-redemption dichotomy
would simply entail too radical a departure from accepted tax
norms. Choosing to ignore the family as an economic unit would
open the door to wholesale avoidance of the dividend rules. In
this circumstance, some version of constructive ownership seems
inevitable, though perhaps the fiction could.be more flexibly drawn
than the current version.
D. The Fiction as Merely a Rule with a Twist
Whether our attachment to existing paradigms proceeds from
intellectual conservatism or from more pragmatic concerns, it is
this attachment to existing paradigms that maintains the indispen-
sability of the fiction. In this sense, the fiction is simply a more
striking version of what we do when we apply a rule of law to a
hard case; that is, we adapt the rule to the novel circumstances.' 43
We give the rule a new twist. This is the most ordinary of pro-
cedures. When we have difficulty stating a general rule that ade-
quately encompasses all the possibilities we think should be included
within its terms, we make up lesser rules that seem analogous with,
though different from, our general one. The peculiarity of the
fiction is that our lesser rule adapts the law by "altering" the
facts. But still, fictions are a way of fairly adapting new fact
patterns to the legal theory already in operation without overthrow-
ing the old system. The form of the existing law is saved while
142. Some might argue that there is a third alternative, that of employing a facts and
circumstances test where the judge is given discretion to attribute or not attribute stock
ownership between family members based on all the facts of the particular case. I think
such an approach simply shifts the choice of whether to employ the fiction of constructive
ownership from the Congress to the judge. But I recognize that it may be superior to
establishing a blanket rule.
143. Fuller wrote, "the fiction is often but a cruder outcropping of a process of
intellectual adaptation which goes on constantly without attracting attention." FULLER,
supra note 13, at 66.
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the present exigencies are resolved in an equitable manner.1" The
aim, then, of the fiction is to give new expression to some under-
lying premise already embodied in the law. 45 In this respect,
fictions may be seen as a basic component of the orderly growth
of law.
E. The Tax Fiction, Economic Symmetry, and a Caveat
In the tax context, the fiction is usually employed as a means
to express some vision of economic symmetry. Thus, for instance,
section 2036, and the various other rules causing inclusion in the
gross estate of property not actually transferred at death,'4 are
based on the premise that property arrangements that are analogous
to transfers at death should be treated in the same manner as
property transferred at death. A further premise is that such
arrangements as those described in those rules do in fact resemble
transfers at death. If these analogical premises are correct, fictions
deriving from them act in combination with the main rule they
modify to achieve a comprehensive and symmetrical treatment of
a unique category of economic events.
There are risks in employing tax fictions to achieve economic
symmetry. Economic symmetry is a matter of judgment. If our
fiction is too narrowly drawn, there may be economically similar
arrangements that escape taxation and, thus, our symmetry is still
incomplete. On the other hand, if our fiction is too widely drawn,
we may catch economically dissimilar arrangements in our tax net.
Even if our fictions are well drawn, we may arrive at a level of
complexity that is not warranted by our desire for symmetry. If
we continue to build fictions around a larger underlying premise,
this suggests that the underlying premise (for example, taxation of
144. Id. at 59-61.
The purpose of the fiction consists in making lighter the difficulties connected
with the assimilation and elaboration of new, more or less revolutionary, legal
principles; in making it possible to leave the traditional learning in its old form,
yet without hindering thereby the practical efficiency of the new in any way.
Id. at 61-62 (quoting lhering). Fuller later suggests that it is not necessarily more convenient
to create a fiction than to state a new rule in non-fictitious terms, but there may be times
when the reform cannot be stated in non-fictitious terms. Id. at 63. For instance, the judge
may use the fiction because he does not know how else to state and explain the new
principle he is applying. Id. at 64. "We are forced to deal with new problems in terms of
an existing conceptual apparatus which in the nature of things can never be entirely adequate
for the future." Id. at 65.
145. "A fiction serves to reconcile a legal result with some expressed or assumed
premise. . . . Where no intellectual premises are assumed, the fiction has no place." Id. at
51.
146. See I.R.C. §§ 2034-2044 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
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property transferred at death in the case of the estate tax) may
need to be changed. 147 In other words, a proliferation of fictions
within an area of law suggests the need for a new paradigm. We
should not try to do too much with the legal fiction. It is by
nature a conservative device. When sweeping reforms are desirable,
the fiction should take a back seat to more direct means of
establishing the law. But the main business of lawmaking is not
radical change. Instead, lawmaking largely involves refinements
upon existing rules. In this area, the fiction is not only useful but
also, on occasion, indispensable.
V. WHY IS IT NECESSARY TO DROP THE FICTION
FROM THE FINAL RECKONING?
"The use of legal fictions is a conservative strategy for change.
There is nothing wrong with such a strategy as long as it is
employed as a means and not as an end.' ' 48 However, legal fictions
overstate the analogies upon which they are based by making
absolute rules out of relative statements. 49 Once we have made
such absolute rules, we place ourselves in an awkward position
with respect to their application. If we apply them literally, we
are likely to apply them toward unjust ends in some cases. If we
apply them in a purposive fashion, we may feel that the rule is
uncertain in its application in some cases. I believe Fuller embraced
the view that uncertainty is to be preferred over arbitrariness.
A. Dropping the Fiction as Awareness of the Analogy that
Gave it Life
Fuller adopts Vaihinger's precept for using fictions that the
fiction "must drop out of the final reckoning."' 15 0 Fuller says we
147. A different paradigm that would eliminate the need for fictions like § 2036(a)
has been suggested by Professor Edward C. Halbach, Jr. See Edward C. Halbach, Jr., An
Accessions Tax, 23 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 211 (1988) (proposing to tax wealth transfers
at the time each interest comes into actual possession).
148. Samek, supra note II, at 315.
149. There may be some cases where the fiction does not overstate its underlying
analogy. Section 7872 may be an example of such a fiction. See supra part IV.B.
150. FULLER, supra note 13, at 116-23.
As all thinking proceeds through analogy and comparison, thought will be speeded
up if we can group related phenomena into units convenient for comparison. But
these constructs must be used as instruments of thought only; we must treat them
as servants to be discharged as soon as they have fulfilled their functions. They
are foreign elements which may be inserted into the equation provisionally to
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do this in the law by extracting from the fiction the meanings
associated with it which are inappropriate. He says that fictions
die through this process. When the fiction is widely understood
correctly without the need of any qualifying remarks, it is dead.",
Unfortunately, Fuller's explanation for how the fiction is
dropped from the final reckoning is the least exact aspect of his
analysis of the legal fiction. What precisely did he mean when he
said we must drop the fiction? As I have already intimated, I
believe that he meant we must apply the fiction with a deliberate
consciousness of the analogy that gave life to the fiction in the
first place.1 2 This aspect of Fuller's view of the fiction is an early
reflection of the argument he would later develop more fully: that
rules must be understood and interpreted in light of the purposes
of their creators.'53 "A fiction becomes understandable only when
we know why it exists, and we can know that only when we know
what actuated its author."' 5 4 Thus, "in simple but loose words,
we can only know what is said when we know why it is said."' 55
B. Formalism's Rejoinder and a Reply
From a formalist perspective Fuller's "purposive" theory of
law is far from self-evident. As discussed previously, the fiction is
'render computation simpler, but which must be dropped from the final reckoning.
Id. at 121.
Failure to drop the fiction is dangerous because too much credence is given to the
false meaning inherent in it. "The isolation of either a concept or a muscular contraction
from its compensatory context is dangerous." Id. at 119 (citation omitted). The "isolation
of a process of thought from a compensatory context" is what Fuller called "hypostati-
zation." Id. at 120. The danger of such isolation in the case of a concept is that context
provides meaning. Fuller elaborated on this idea by describing three dangers inherent in
concepts; 1) their centripetal force, 2) their capacity for inducing reification, and 3) their
metaphorical contamination. Id. at 123. Centripetal force relates to the tendency of concepts
to exceed their bounds. Reification refers to the tendency of concepts to become isolated
from the reasoning process which produced them. Metaphorical contamination refers to
the tendency to take fictions literally. Id.
151. Id. at 118.
152. Samek puts it this way, "A legal fiction must be justified as a means to a social
end." Samek, supra note 11, at 314.
153. A widely cited explication of this theory is Fuller's article, Positivism and Fidelity
to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958). Fuller, however,
developed this idea in many of his other writings. See SUMMERS, supra note 28, ch. 2.
154. FULLER, supra note 13, at 49-50. We can see the roots of this idea in Vaihinger,
who wrote: "All preoccupation with fictions as such is valueless and harmful because
fictions only possess value in their relation to a purpose." VAIHINGER, supra note 27, at
123.
155. FULLER, supra note 13, at 50 (quoting C.K. OGDEN & 1.A. RICHARDS, THE
MEANING OF MEANING 94 n.l (2d ed. 1927)).
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a formalistic device, especially when it is employed by a legisla-
ture. 156 It is because we want to treat the pre-existing rules as
having fixed and settled meanings that we are sometimes forced
to resort to the use of fictions. Having resorted to a fiction, it
would seem contradictory to treat the fiction as having no fixed
or certain meaning of its own. Is there some basis to differentiate
how we should apply the fiction from how we apply other rules?
To consider that question, let us continue with the disclaimer
rules. We could say that the fiction that a disclaimed bequest is
no bequest need not be understood on any deeper level in order
to be applied. In principle, it is a simple rule after all; if one
refuses a bequest, the law treats the bequest as if it was never
made. What is there to understand? The answer depends on the
context in which the rule is sought to be applied.
Suppose, for instance, a wife disclaims a bequest from her
husband in a manner that satisfies section 2518 except that her
disclaimer states: "I direct that this bequest shall pass to our
children in equal shares." The disclaimer rules provide that the
disclaimer is only valid if, "as a result of such [disclaimer], the
interest passes without any direction on the part of the person
making the disclaimer."' 57 Does the language in the wife's dis-
claimer directing the property to the children violate this rule? On
a mechanical level it appears to do so, and we may have no trouble
saying that the disclaimer is invalid. But what if the property
would have passed to the children in equal shares even without
that language in her disclaimer, either by operation of law or
because of a contingency clause in the husband's will? If we can
give effect to the disclaimer without paying heed to the disclaimor's
directive and also without violating her directive, should we treat
the disclaimer as valid? It is difficult to see how we can decide
that question without looking at the purpose of the disclaimer
statute. In this respect, there is an ineluctable connection between
what the law is and what the law ought to be.
It would strike many as reasonable to give effect to the
disclaimer even though in a technical sense the rule is violated.
Since the effect of the directive is the same as if there were no
156. When a legislature creates a fiction, it does not find a new meaning in the already
existing rules in the same way a judge does (if we assume that a judge finds rather than
makes law). The judge who creates a fiction is obliged to offer her fiction as an interpretation
of an existing rule while the legislature, in its actions, is implicitly conceding that the pre-
existing rule did not include the meaning attributed to it now because of the fiction.
157. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4) (1988).
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directive, the analogy underlying section 2518 that a disclaimed
bequest is like no bequest is equally applicable to the case.158 One
might contend that the fiction of section 2518 is intended to prevent
an injury. Too technical an interpretation of the provision defeats
that purpose. 1 9
An essential restraint on our tendency to employ fictional
rules as formalistically as other rules is the recognition that they
are creations of our own minds in a more dramatic sense than
non-fiction rules. This understanding may justify our treating fic-
tions with less linguistic respect than other rules. The fiction is a
mere form we employ to make other rules work more fairly. When
it fails to serve this purpose, why should we honor the empty
form? Fuller believed "[n]o theory or dogma can solve the problem
of how far we ought to generalize or 'conceptualize' the law. It,
is a question of balance and judgment . . . The ultimate problem
of law is balance." 16 This problem is exemplified by the legal
fiction. It is a rule created to do justice, but like any rule, its
strict interpretation may, on occasion, interfere with a just out-
come. Whether it does so in a particular case is a question of
judgment. What course we should pursue when a fiction's strict
meaning is not consonant with our ideas of justice is also a question
of judgment.
All of this sounds vague and unhelpful. If the key to applying
rules well is the exercise of good judgment, one might conclude
that the concept of a system ruled by laws rather than by persons
is utterly chimerical. If judgment decides legal questions, what
happens to the determinacy of law? I will not attempt to resolve
this question here.' 6 1 Instead, I wish to conclude by focusing on a
context in which dropping the fiction can have, I believe, a clear
and definite meaning. I am referring to situations involving mul-
158. It is not entirely clear what the government's position on this would be. In the
regulations, there is a similar example where effect is given to the disclaimer. See Treas.
Reg. § 25.2518-2(e)(5) ex. 8 (1954). But in that example, it is specifically stated that under
state law, the disclaimor's direction that she intended the property to go to her children
was considered merely "precatory," having "no legal effect." Id. In my example, I am
assuming that the disclaimor's direction would be honored under state law but that this
fact is irrelevant because the same consequences would flow from a valid disclaimer.
159. This might be seen as a variation on the maxim set forth by Fuller (quoting
Blackstone) that "[n]o fiction shall be allowed to work an injury." FULLER, supra note 13,
at 50 (Fictio legis neminem laedit).
160. Id. at 136-37.
161. I have taken a stab at the question of the determinacy of tax law in another
article. See John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule
Simplification in the Law of Taxation, 68 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming Winter 1992-93).
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tiple fictions. I have somewhat arbitrarily divided these situations
into three categories. The first is when a fiction, carried to its
logical conclusion, gives rise to another fiction. The second is when
a fiction affects the application of another fiction. The third is
when we attempt to create a fiction by analogy to a fiction. My
thesis for all three of these contexts is that the principle of dropping
the fiction from the final reckoning can have literal meaning.
However, even in these contexts, I suggest that the question of
whether to obey the directive to drop the fiction remains a question
of judgment.
C. Dropping the Fiction as a Way to Prevent the
Multiplication of Fictions
Sometimes the creation of a fiction can be seen as having
consequences extending beyond its immediate intended effect. This
happens when the fictive pattern is carried to its logical extreme.
Walter Cliff and Benjamin Cohen point this out in the context of
a transfer pricing adjustment under section 482. Section 482 allows
the Secretary of the Treasury to reallocate income and deductions
among related persons or entities to clearly reflect income. It
commonly may have application to sales of goods and services
between related corporations where the prices established by the
related parties have not been set to comport with similar arm's-
length transactions between unrelated third parties. 162 Cliff and
Cohen point out that the application of section 482 may tempt us
to create "collateral" fictions. To illustrate, if the price charged
by Company A to its sister Company B (both owned by Parent
Company) for a sale of goods is increased by $100 for tax purposes
under section 482, how do we then account for the economic
reality that no additional cash passes from Company A to Com-
pany B as a result of the reallocation of $100 of income for tax
purposes? If we follow the fictional reallocation of income all the
way through, as logic would seem to demand, we may have to
create a $100 constructive dividend from Company B to the Parent
Company, and a $100 constructive capital contribution from the
Parent Company to Company A, in order to account for Company
A's retention of the $100 additional cash it was deemed to have
paid to Company B. 163 Such a constructive dividend is clearly a
legal fiction born of the prior fiction. Cliff and Cohen argue that
162. Cliff & Cohen, supra note 11, at 40.
163. Id. at 41-42.
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the better approach is to limit the application of section 482 to its
immediate purpose of reallocating income and to ignore the col-
lateral fictions it might be thought to raise.16' They describe this
as a "contextual approach" to tax fictions. This contextual ap-
proach is also a literal example of dropping the fiction from the
final reckoning. By contending that no constructive dividend is
generated by the reallocation of income, Cliff and Cohen are
directly asserting that the fiction must be abandoned after it has
accomplished its immediate purpose.
D. Dropping the Fiction in the Application of a Fiction to
a Fiction
What happens when we apply a legal fiction to a legal fiction?
One author contends that the result is science fiction.' 65 The ar-
gument Cliff and Cohen make concerning the fictional income
produced by section 482 is a more restrained statement of that
point of view. In cases where one fiction follows from another,
Cliff and Cohen argue that the second fiction should be dropped.
But in some cases, the second fiction is inescapable. In such cases,
if we are to drop any fiction, it is the first fiction which must be
dropped. An impediment to doing so, however, is the formalism
typical of tax thinking-that gave rise to the fiction in the first
place.
For an illustration, let us return to the disclaimer rules of
section 2518 and consider the consequences of successive disclaim-
ers. In general, the disclaimer rules provide that a timely disclaimer
must be made within nine months of the event creating the dis-
claimor's property interest. 166 In our example, assume these facts:
Testator leaves property in trust with the income payable to Al
for life and also gives Al a testamentary power to appoint the
corpus to anyone he chooses, including his own estate. In default
of Al's exercise of the general power of appointment, the corpus
will pass to Bill upon Al's death. 167 Under these facts, Al has nine
months from Testator's date of death to disclaim either the life
estate or the general power, or both.1 68 The question is, if Al
164. Id. at 53-59.
165. Ziff, supra note 11, at 160. Professor Ziff was writing in the context of the
Canadian felony-murder rule.
166. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2)(A) (1988). The statute is tolled if the disclaimor is a minor.
I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2)(B) (1988).
167. For estate tax purposes, Al will be deemed the owner of the trust corpus, i.e.,
the corpus will be included in his gross estate. See I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2) (1988).
168. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1) (1954)..
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disclaims the general power of appointment, how long does Bill
have to disclaim the interest passing to him as a result of Al's
disclaimer? In considering this question, it is well to take note that
had Al exercised the general power of appointment by appointing
the property to Bill, Bill would have been allowed nine month3
from the date of appointment in which to disclaim the property
transferred to him by Al's exercise. 69 Under the circumstances,
Al's disclaimer is economically equivalent to an exercise in Bill's
favor.
In a pragmatic sense, Bill's interest does not come into exis-
tence until Al's disclaimer. 70 If this is so, should not Bill's nine
month period in which to disclaim begin on the date of Al's
disclaimer? The regulations appear to require that Bill also disclaim
within nine months of Testator's death.' 7' In some circumstances,
this could lead to an unfair result, as when Al disclaims on the
last possible day and Bill has no opportunity to evaluate his
circumstances in light of Al's disclaimer. How do we explain the
difference between what seems to be the fair answer and the
regulations' answer? It is because the regulations fail to drop the
fiction.
It will be recalled that the disclaimer rules are based on the
analogy that a disclaimed bequest is more like no bequest than it
is like a bequest. Thus, disclaimed bequests are treated as if they
had never occurred. In the case of Al and Bill described above, if
no bequest had ever been made to Al, then Bill's interest in the
169. Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(3) (1954).
170. Pragmatically speaking, Bill owned nothing of consequence. This is also true
from an estate tax perspective. Prior to Al's disclaimer, Bill had nothing more than an
expectancy from an estate tax perspective. This is because one who holds a general power
of appointment is the owner of the property subject to the power for estate tax purposes.
See I.R.C. § 2041 (1988). Thus, prior to Al's disclaimer, Al was the owner of the property
for estate tax purposes.
In property law, a general power of appointment is not considered an interest in
property. The tax law accepts this idea in principle but then overrides it. Like § 2036(a),
§ 2041 is a legal fiction born of an analogy to § 2033, that is, § 2041 draws into the gross
estate property not held at death (i.e., property over which the decedent held only a general
power of appointment). The difference is that there is no question about the general power
being held at death, but only whether the power is "property." In effect, § 2041 redesignates
a general power as a form of property without saying so directly. See STEPHENS ET AL,
supra note 84, 4.05[51[c], 4.13[1]. One might reasonably conclude that § 2041 is not
the legal fiction involved here. Instead, the true legal fiction may be the property law
principle that a general power is not property.
171. The regulations state that "[a] person who receives an interest in property as the
result of a qualified disclaimer of the interest must disclaim the previously disclaimed
interest no later than 9 months after the date of the taxable transfer creating the interest
in the preceding disclaimant." Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(3) (1954).
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remainder would have been fixed on Testator's date of death.
Continuing with that fiction, the time in which Bill is permitted
to disclaim should run from Testator's date of death. But the truth
is that a bequest was made to Al, and Bill had no reasonable
expectation of receiving the remainder until Al'disclaimed. When
we apply the disclaimer rules to Bill, we could drop the fiction
that Al's disclaimed bequest never occurred. If we did this, we
would conclude that the event creating Bill's interest was Al's
disclaimer, and that ihe nine month period for Bill's disclaimer
should begin to run from that time.
Should we drop the first fiction when we apply the second in
the context described above? I am inclined to think we should. I
believe such an interpretation is consistent with the language em-
ployed by section 2518 to create the fiction. Moreover, like Fuller,
I believe a legal fiction should be employed in light of its purpose.
Otherwise, its underlying truth can be lost, and we will be left
with only its falsity to guide us. 172 It is instructive to remember
Justice Cardozo's advice: "Metaphors in law are to be narrowly
watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often
by enslaving it.' ' 17 Having said this, however, I feel constrained
to also say that I am enough of a formalist to believe that our
power to drop the fiction is not unlimited.
The fiction may be written in such a way as to deny us the
freedom to drop the fiction. An example of this is provided by
section 7872. Not only does it apply to interest-free "compensa-
tion" loans between employers and employees, it also applies to
interest-free "gift" loans between family members. 74 It causes us
to treat the failure to charge interest as a gift of the interest by
the lender to the borrower, followed by a payment of the interest
by the borrower to the lender. Thus, the lender has interest income
for income tax purposes. But the application of the fiction in
section 7872 is not limited to the income tax. It also applies in
the gift tax area. 175 Thus, the lender may have a gift tax liability,
172. When this happens, our legal fiction has been converted into what one writer
describes as a "legal myth." Hamilton, supra note 11, at 1470-71. "While legal fictions
are false propositions that are recognized as false but acted upon as if true, 'legal myth'
refers to false propositions that are erroneously taken to be true and acted upon as if
true." Id. A similar idea has been described as "the meta phenomenon." Samek, supra
note 11, at 291. "The meta phenomenon is the human propensity to displace 'primary'
with 'secondary' concerns, that is concerns about ends with concerns about means. The
latter come to be perceived as primary, and distort the former in their own image." Id.
173. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
174. See I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(A) (1988).
175. See I.R.C. § 7872(a)(1) (1988).
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as well as an income tax liability, as a result of the interest-free
loan. The statute does not give us the option of dropping the
fiction after the fiction has served its immediate purpose. Instead,
it has chosen to extend the fiction to its logical end.
There is no universally recognizable moment when we should
drop the fiction. At times we should drop the fiction as soon as
it has performed its immediately intended service. At other times,
it may be that we should carry the fiction as far as it will take
us. In the particular context of section 7872, for instance, I cannot
say that the failure to drop the fiction represents an error. By
extending the fiction of section 7872 into the gift tax, it seems fair
to say that a greater economic symmetry has been achieved in the
operation of the gift tax. 76 Whether or not we should extend a
particular fiction beyond its immediate ambit is a function of how
much truth underlies the fiction. The truer the underlying concept,
the further the fiction may be extended without threat of harm.
E. Dropping the Fiction in Creating Fictions
There is another circumstance involving multiple fictions where
the need to drop the fiction may be more obvious than has thus
far been demonstrated. Here I refer to the creation of a fiction
by analogy to another fiction. If we fail to drop the first fiction
when we engraft a second fiction onto an existing fiction, our
second fiction is likely to suffer from a lack of conformity to
basic principles. This will be illustrated with two examples. The
first example is a simple generic one, and the second is a more
complex one concerning the tax law.
1. A Generic Example
It is readily apparent that an analogy to an analogy is likely
to become attenuated with respect to the original source of analogy.
For instance, if we say a bicycle is like a motorcycle and a
motorcycle is like a car, does it follow that a bicycle is like a car?
Though we may say that they have some characteristics in common,
we would be cautious about extending the comparison too far.
Suppose that a law were enacted which stated that motorcycles are
176. It might be noted that the idea of imputing interest to interest-free loans received
its most important judicial approval in the gift tax context. See Dickman v. Commissioner,
465 U.S. 330 (1984) (interest-free loan is a gift of the foregone interest by the lender to
the borrower). The Dickman decision was the immediate stimulus for the enactment of §
7872. See BITTKER & MCMAHON, supra note 21, 31.4.
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defined to include bicycles for licensing and other purposes. This
would be a legal fiction since bicycles are not motorcycles in
common parlance. Suppose that a few years later, a law was
enacted saying that motorcycles are automobiles for licensing and
other purposes. This would be a second legal fiction since motor-
cycles are not in fact automobiles in the common sense. The two
rules, when read together, may have the effect of denominating
bicycles as automobiles for regulatory purposes. 177 If this was not
the intended result, the error would be the result of failing to drop
the first fiction when the second fiction was created. Put differ-
ently, the second fiction failed to take account of the earlier fiction
and operated more broadly than was intended. "A liar should
have a good memory.'
17
2. Section 2036(c)
A tax case study involving failure to drop the fiction in
creating a fiction is provided by recently repealed section 2036(c).
79
Some readers will recall that this controversial provision was so
widely despised that when it was repealed in 1990, that repeal was
made retroactive to its date of enactment.8 0 Section 2036(c) was
enacted in 19871' to put an end to the tax planning devices broadly
described as estate freezes. 8 2 The classic estate freeze is the cor-
porate recapitalization in which the shareholder/owner receives two
classes of stock. The more valuable of the two classes is preferred
stock with dividend and liquidation preferences approximating the
177. For example, bicyclists might be required to have driver's licenses and to carry
liability insurance.
178. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMUIIAR QUOTATIONS 117 (quoting MARcus FABIUS QUINTILI-
ANUS, DE INSTITUTIONE ORATORIOA, bk. IV, 2, 91).
179. See Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, P.L. 101-508, § 11,601, 104 Stat. 1388-
490. Section 2036(c) was replaced with I.R.C. §§ 2701-04 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
180. Id. Section 2036(c), however, was not without its defenders. See, e.g., John A.
Bogdanski & Lawrence R. Brown, Farewell To Freezes: Section 2036(c), 42 TAX NOTES
1633 (1989). Dozens of articles were written about § 2036(c) during the three years it was
on the books. I was one of the many who wrote about some aspect of the provision. See
John A. Miller, Gift (W)rapping the Estate Freeze, 41 TAx NOTES 1335 (1988).
181. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 203, § 10,402(a), 101 Stat.
1330-431 (1987) (Titles IX and X of the Act, where the tax provisions are found, are
sometimes referred to as the Revenue Act of 1987).
182. H.R. REP. No. 391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1043 (1987). As will be discussed in
the text, earlier that same year the Tax Court had rejected the Service's argument that the
gifted growth stock in a corporate recapitalization freeze is includable in a decedent's gross
estate under § 2036(a). Estate of Boykin v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 345 (1987).
For a brief discussion of the nature of an estate freeze and for citations to more detailed
treatments, see STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 84, 4.08[9][b].
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business's present income stream and present fair market value.
The taxpayer also receives common stock which will only have
value if the business grows. By giving away the common stock to
his children, the taxpayer excluded (before enactment of section
2036(c)) any appreciation in the value of the business from his
gross estate, and did so at a low gift tax cost. 83
Prior to the enactment of section 2036(c), the Internal Revenue
Service had sought to curtail the effectiveness of the estate freeze
as a tax saving device by arguing in Estate of John G. Boykin
that section 2036(a) applied to estate freezes.11 4 The reader will
recall that section 2036(a) draws back into the gross estate re-
mainders given away during life in which the grantor retained a
life estate. The Service argued that a recapitalization, like the one
just described in which a person gives away common stock while
retaining preferred stock, is the legal equivalent of a gift of a
remainder while retaining a life estate. One can readily understand
this position. In particular, one might say that like the remainder,
the common stock has only a future value. Similarly, like the life
estate, the preferred stock provides the ability to presently enjoy
the benefits of ownership of the business. However, the tax court
rejected the Service's argument that the gifted growth stock in a
corporate recapitalization freeze was includable in a decedent's
gross estate under section 2036(a). The court reasoned that the
recapitalization had created two distinct property interests and that
with the gift of the growth interest, the taxpayer had effectively
parted with all interest in it.85 Thus, section 2036(a) could not
apply because the growth stock had been given away with no
strings attached.
Having unsuccessfully attempted to apply section 2036(a) to
estate freezes, the government apparently saw the estate freeze
183. Typically, for gift tax purposes, the taxpayer would place a very low value on
the common stock given away. He could support this valuation by reference to the
liquidation value of the interest, that is, if the business were liquidated today it would have
no value because of the liquidation preference of the preferred stock.
There are a variety of possible freeze maneuvers. In general, an estate freeze involved
division of ownership of a business into two parts, a frozen interest and a growth interest.
Ideally, the frozen interest was worth the present value of the business and the growth
interest held only the potential for becoming valuable if the business prospered. By giving
away (at a low gift tax cost) the growth interest, a taxpayer could maintain control of the
business and continue to enjoy the income from the business while excluding any future
appreciation in its value from her gross estate. For descriptions of the various forms of
estate freezes, see Byrle M. Abbin, The Value Capping Cafeteria-Selecting the Appropriate
Freeze Technique, 15 U. MIAMI INST. ON EST. PLAN. ch. 20 (1981).
184. Estate of Boykin v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 345 (1987).
185. Id. at 348.
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problem as uncovering a flaw in section 2036 rather than as a
problem outside the scope of that section. 86 Thus, the perceived
solution to the estate freeze problem was to amend that section
by adding section 2036(c). Section 2036(c) eliminated the estate tax
benefits of freezes by treating the retained frozen interest in an
estate freeze (the preferred stock in the example above) as the
equivalent of a retained life estate in the given-up growth interest
(the common stock) for purposes of the application of section
2036(a). 187 In short, section 2036(c) was the legislative overturning
of the tax court's decision in Boykin. 8
I have previously described section 2036(a) as a legal fiction
in the sense that it rests upon an analogy to the principle embodied
in section 2033: that the estate tax is levied upon property owned
and transferred at death. Section 2036(a) creates the fiction that a
decedent owned and transferred a remainder at death when, in
fact, the remainder was typically given away years earlier. Thus,
section 2036(c) was a legal fiction grafted onto a legal fiction; that
is, it drew an analogy to an analogy. Consequently, the analogy
in section 2036(c), that the preferred stock is to the common stock
as the life estate is to the remainder, is attenuated from the ultimate
source of the analogy, section 2033. In attacking estate freezes,
the drafters of section 2036(c) failed to drop the fiction.
It is arguable that section 2036(c) did not comport with the
central premise of the estate tax of taxing the transfer of property
at death. In this sense, section 2036(c) was an altogether different
order of fiction from the fiction established by section 2036(a).
That section involves property arrangements where there is reten-
tion of some present interest while transferring a future interest in
the same property. Retention of a life estate makes for a reasonable
186. See H.R. REP. No. 391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1043 (1987) ("The Committee
believes that keeping a preferred stock interest in an enterprise while giving away the
common stock resembles a retained life estate, and should be treated as such.").
187. Section 2036(c) was structured to piggyback on § 2036(a). "For purposes of
subsection [2036](a), if-(A) any person holds a substantial interest in an enterprise, and,
(B) such person . . . transfers [a growth interest] while retaining [a frozen interest] then
the retention shall be considered to be a retention of [a life estate]." I.R.C. § 2036(c)(1)
(1988 & Supp. II 1990). For discussions of the 1987 version of § 2036(c), see Dennis 1.
Belcher & Michele A. Wood, Section 2036(c): Has the Ice Age Arrived for Estate Freezes?
13 TAX MGMNT. EST. GIFTS AND TR. J. 63 (1988); James C. Magner & Zenon Z. Tencza,
The Freeze Gets Iced: Section 2036 After OBRA, 39 TAX NOTES 505 (1988).
188. The impact of § 2036(c) was much broader than the mere overturning of Boykin,
however. See, e.g., Richard L. Dees, Section 2036(c): The Monster That Ate Estate Planning
and Installment Sales, Buy-Sells, Options, Employment Contracts, and Leases, 66 TAXES
876 (1988).
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analogy between a remainder (which passes into possession on the
transferor's death) and other property actually owned and trans-
mitted at death. In both situations, the property does not fully
pass from the transferor to the beneficiary until the transferor
dies. Moreover, the extinguishment of the life estate is a necessary
condition precedent to the enjoyment of the remainder. In contra-
distinction, unlike the life estate, the preferred stock in an estate
freeze is not extinguished by the death of its holder. Nor is any
possessory interest retained until death in the common stock. In a
formal sense, the property transactions attacked by section 2036(c)
did not involve a division of property between present and future
interests. Instead, they involved division of the property into two
or more distinct present interests. Thus, the fiction in section
2036(c) that the common stock was transmitted at death was much
more attenuated than the fiction in section 2036(a) that the re-
mainder was transferred at death.
Does this prove that section 2036(c) was badly conceived? Not
by itself. The argument can still be made that section 2036(c), or
something like it, was a necessary response to the estate planners's
legerdemain. 18 9 One could even argue that some estate freezes
functioned as divisions of property into present and future interests
even if both interests appeared to be present interests. However,
this argument runs counter to our formalist tendencies in tax law.
Or, if formalism is to fall by the wayside, such cases, if they exist,
should be winnable by the government under section 2036(a) by
virtue of a substance-over-form analysis.
Under the precept that the fiction should be dropped from
the final reckoning, section 2036(a) was not the proper source of
analogy for section 2036(c). If the drafters of section 2036(c) had
followed that precept, they would have been obliged to create a
fiction that was a direct analogy to the transfer at death principle
of section 2033. Had they attempted to do this, they might have
seen more clearly how tenuous the analogical connection was
between an estate freeze and a transfer at death. They might have
concluded, as was later done, that the problem posed by the estate
freeze was essentially a valuation problem. In other words, the
real issue was whether the growth interest was being undervalued
for gift tax purposes at the time of its transfer. The provisions
replacing section 2036(c), sections 2701 through 2704, approach
189. See, e.g., Bogdanski, supra note 180, at 1654.
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the matter of the estate freeze more directly as a valuation problem' 9°
by establishing some mechanisms for valuing growth interests to
insure that they are not undervalued.
Although sections 2701 through 2704 are quite arbitrary and
irksome, 91 they have not yet aroused anything approaching the
outcry that arose after the enactment of section 2036(c). This is
evidence that the firestorm of controversy section 2036(c) aroused,
and which ultimately led to its retroactive repeal, was due to its
lack of a sound analogical foundation and not simply to the fact
that it closed down some favored estate planning schemes. Its
drafters failed to adequately consider its source of analogy. The
price paid for this failure to drop the fiction was a significant one.
The statute's lack of a sound analogical connection to the rest of
the estate tax made it difficult to integrate into the existing ana-
lytical framework. For three years following its enactment, prac-
titioners and their clients hesitated over how to plan the clients's
estates while the government vacillated over how to apply the
statute. In the end, those persons who were bold or ignorant
enough to disregard section 2036(c) were left unscathed while
everyone else spent time and money in a wasted effort to come to
grips with it.
A problem in the application of tax fictions, as with the
application of law generally, lies in deciding how far we ought to
generalize concerning the application of rules to facts. That is, we
are always faced with questions of interpretation. In the end, this
question is one of judgment. But recollecting and understanding
our premises is a necessary first step to arriving at fair conclusions.
190. For some preliminary analyses of these rules, see STEPHENS ET AL., supra note
84, ch. 4A (1991 Supp.); Lloyd L. Plaine & Pam H. Schneider, Proposed Valuation
Regulations Flesh Out Operation of the Subtraction Method, 75 J. TAX'N 82 (1991); Lloyd
L. Plaine & Pam H. Schneider, Proposed Valuation Regulations Provide Workable Excep-
tions for Transfers in Trust, 75 J. TAX'N 142 (1991); Lewis D. Solomon & Lewis J. Saret,
Tax Planning for Closely Held Corporations Under the New Estate Freeze Rules, 16 REv.
TAX'N OF IND. 3 (1992).
191. In general, these complex provisions utilize the legal fiction that the retained
interest in an estate freeze has a zero value. Thus, in effect, the transferor is treated as if
he gave the entire underlying asset away. This assures thai the growth interest is not
undervalued for gift tax purposes. These provisions raise a number of issues concerning
multiple fictions. For example, if the transferor is deemed to give away during life the
entire asset even though he retains an income interest in it, should § 2036(a) still apply
when he dies? The statutory answer is that § 2036(a) will still apply. See, e.g., I.R.C. §
2702(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. II 1990) (§ 2702 applies solely for purposes of the gift tax). But
it should be noted that in this particular context, credit will be given for the gift tax paid
in computing the estate tax. See I.R.C. § 2001(b) (1988). It is tempting to go on at some
length. concerning these new provisions and their treatment of the multiple fictions they
raise. However, such detailed analysis is beyond the scope of the present article.
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When we see the analogy from which our fiction derives, we have
greater assurance that we can apply it properly. This is because
rules are applied best when applied with a consciousness of their
purposes. When we draw an analogy, we should seek to draw as
direct a connection as possible between the case sought to be
addressed and the guiding paradigm sought to be applied. Dropping
any fiction that may intervene between those two things is a way
of doing this.
VI. CONCLUSION
A fiction is only worthy of use if it embodies a truth on a
non-literal plane. Its underlying truth, then, is its chief virtue. But
it is its literal falsity that makes it useful. By twisting the facts,
the worthy fiction brings some new circumstance within the op-
eration of pre-existing rules in a fashion that leads to a more
equitable result than would otherwise be obtained. Like the two
sides of a coin, the two aspects of the fiction, its truth and its
falsity, are inextricably bound. Like the two sides of a coin, those
dual aspects are difficult to observe at the same moment. To see
a fiction is to choose a perspective. With a tilt of the head the
perspective can change, and the fiction can disappear. This fickle
quality of the fiction is fundamental to its strange melding of truth
and falsity. It is also the key to its utility. Metaphor often captures
truth in ways that mere cold prose can never achieve.
Though the tax fiction partakes of metaphor, it is often simply
a more striking version of the analogical thinking that tax lawyers
employ every day. In that sense, fictions are an essential element
of tax law. In tax law, legal fictions are relatively benign tools for
effectuating positive changes in an incremental fashion. By con-
verting comparative statements into absolute rules, tax fictions
serve to render the operation of law consistent with its underlying
economic premises. The danger of employing them is that the
falsehood in the fiction can take on the appearance of truth. It is
necessary to remember that a good fiction is a matter of context.
Moreover, since fictions result from analogy, we can only judge
the fiction if we first recognize the analogy underlying it. A bad
fiction, then, is often based upon a bad analogy or a wrong
analogy. Unsound analogies are a natural result of drawing an
analogy by reference to a rule which itself rests upon an analogy.
This tendency toward unsoundness of the second analogy derives
from its more tenuous connection to the legal principle or paradigm
that serves as the ultimate source of analogy.
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In the end, no analysis of the legal fiction can fairly reduce
its operation to a mechanical formula. No evaluation of the merits
of a particular fiction can escape the need to exercise balance and
judgment in its employment. A tax fiction is like any tax rule: its
merit rests in questions of tax policy and tax theory as they are
raised by particular cases. The justification for most tax fictions
is their utility in achieving the general tax policy goal of economic
symmetry. We use the fiction to treat cases that are substantively
alike in a consistent manner though they may differ in form. But
sometimes the very idea that we can distinguish between substance
and form seems itself a fiction.
